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RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
INTRODUCTION 
More than any other region of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa has struggled 
with extreme poverty,1 and the continent’s poor are likely to suffer 
disproportionately from the effects of the recent global financial crisis.2  To 
minimize the human costs of poverty, African countries  desperately need to 
increase their standards of living by promoting economic growth and 
development.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) will continue to play an 
important role in this process by providing the financing that, for many African 
countries, is otherwise unavailable.3  And to attract this FDI, developing 
countries will continue to rely heavily on Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs)—agreements between two countries, usually a developed “home” 
country and a developing “host” country, that govern the promotion and 
protection of foreign investments.4 
But FDI and BITs appear to have failed in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This is for 
two reasons.  First, not all FDI is created equal.  FDI will only promote 
meaningful development if the economic growth it fuels is sustainable.  Africa 
has experienced many periods of economic expansion over the past thirty 
years, but frequent growth collapses have offset much of these gains.5  Prior to 
the current financial crisis, for example, annual FDI inflows to Africa’s least 
developed countries (LDCs) increased consistently for almost a decade.6  
 
 1 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2–3 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 GLOBAL MONITORING 
REPORT] (“At a regional level, Sub-Saharan Africa lags on all MDGs [UN Millennium Development 
Goals].”). 
 2 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 48–49 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 GLOBAL MONITORING 
REPORT] (estimating that in 2009, three-fourths of Sub-Saharan African countries could experience a rise in 
the number of extreme poor). 
 3 See Albert H. De Wet & Reneé Van Eyden, Capital Mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Panel Data 
Approach, 73 S. AFR. J. ECON. 22, 22 (2005) (noting that foreign investment and foreign aid are often the only 
sources of financing in Africa). 
 4 Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on 
Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 95, 103 (2005). 
 5 2009 GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT, supra note 2, at 50. 
 6 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2009: Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, 45, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (July 2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 World Investment Report]. 
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Because this FDI was concentrated in Africa’s extractive industries, it was 
extremely vulnerable to falling commodity prices; as a result, FDI to Africa’s 
LDCs was expected to decrease in 2009.7  Second, African BITs have failed to 
convince foreign investors.  While Africa’s share of FDI inflows among 
developing countries has increased steadily during recent years, the actual 
amounts of FDI African LDCs have received are fairly small.8  These amounts 
are even smaller if FDI in the extractive sector is excluded.9  These failures 
warrant a general reconsideration of the kinds of BITs that African nations are 
signing. 
The emergence of BITs as the basic foundation for the international 
investment regime,10 however, is not the direct source of Africa’s difficulties 
attracting FDI.  BITs have the potential to be particularly useful in Africa.11  
The real problem is that African BITs rarely deviate from a standard model 
that has developed over time.12 
In order to be effective in Africa, BITs must account for, and be better 
tailored to, individual countries’ circumstances and needs.13  Both highly 
underdeveloped and post-conflict nations, for example, cannot tackle extreme 
poverty without sustained economic growth and external financing.  They must 
attract investment at all costs, and they need BITs that are very protective of 
 
 7 Id. at 45, 49. 
 8 Id. at 49; see also Leonce Ndikumana & Sher Verick, The Linkages Between FDI and Domestic 
Investment: Unravelling the Developmental Impact of Foreign Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa 2 (Inst. for 
the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 3296, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1136458 (noting that Africa’s share of FDI since the 1990s has been significantly 
lower than it was during the 1970s). 
 9 Natural resources attract investors interested in the extractive sector, so the presence of a BIT is less 
relevant to FDI in resource-rich countries. 
 10 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 526 (1998) (“In an era when virtually every 
developing state has concluded at least one BIT and such treaties are being signed at about the rate of one 
every other day, states may find that it is necessary to conclude a BIT simply to avoid sending investors a 
negative signal about the stability of their investment climate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 61–63.  Further, because this Comment assumes that BITs will 
continue to serve as the primary legal mechanism governing FDI for the foreseeable future, a general criticism 
of BITs is of little practical use. 
 12 Mosoti, supra note 4, at 115–16. 
 13 Cf. UNCTAD, Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on Int’l Monetary Affairs and Dev., 
Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Developing Countries: Policies, Evidence and Ways Forward, 3, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/MDPB/G24/2006/4 (Nov. 2006) (prepared by Mushtaq H. Khan) [hereinafter 
Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms] (arguing that corruption reduction strategies should be specifically 
tailored or risk diverting attention from more important issues). 
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FDI.  BITs that require complex institutional reforms, on the other hand, set 
unrealistic goals that divert the parties’ attention from more important issues.14 
For more developed African countries, most BITs do little to actually 
promote FDI in the areas that are most important for development—such as 
infrastructure and downstream activities.15  These BITs tend to overemphasize 
the protection of foreign investors while doing little to promote or protect 
home-country interests.16  Broad compensation requirements for regulatory 
takings, for example, can have a chilling effect on host-government policy 
making.17  And BITs that provide foreign investors with substitutes for weak 
domestic institutions may lead to a deterioration of local institutions, the rule 
of law, and overall governance.18  Given that the prevailing economic 
conditions and investment policies are usually more influential on the decision 
to invest than the mere presence of a BIT, these BITs may result in a net loss to 
the home country.19 
Modern U.S. and Canadian BITs have adopted innovative provisions that 
deserve special consideration.  These BITs provide home-country investors 
with more effective protections, while at the same time encouraging stronger 
institutions and better policies.  They also require a heightened commitment to 
economic liberalism that may encourage more sustainable growth.  Although 
these BITs still need to be better tailored to individual countries, they are 
promising. 
 
 14 Cf. id. at 21 (arguing that strategies should aim to transform failing states into developing states rather 
than set unachievable goals that divert attention from more critical reforms). 
 15 2009 GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT, supra note 2, at 71–72, 74 (“An adequate supply of infrastructure 
has long been viewed as a key ingredient for economic development. . . .  Despite progress in recent years, the 
region with the greatest infrastructure challenge remains Sub-Saharan Africa. . . .  The gaps in infrastructure 
coverage reflect a large unmet need for infrastructure investment in developing countries.”); 2009 World 
Investment Report, supra note 6, at 47. 
 16 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal 
Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 457, 
468, 554 (2007). 
 17 Id. at 554. 
 18 Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 119–22 (2005) (arguing that BITs reduce governmental and 
institutional quality by “depriving key actors from a need to invest in institutional improvement”). 
 19 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 95–96 (2005) (“No language in a BIT 
binds a source country to encourage its investors and companies to invest abroad. . . .  Thus, the BIT is often a 
codification, and not a source, of pro-foreign investment policies.”). 
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This Comment argues that Africa’s failure to attract FDI can be solved 
through the adoption of BITs that account for and adapt to each country’s 
individual and changing circumstances.  This Comment proposes a three-group 
taxonomy20 of non-resource-rich African nations21 based on their respective 
FDI and domestic investment levels.22  Group One is composed of countries 
with low FDI and low domestic investment levels; Group Two is composed of 
countries with high FDI and low domestic investment levels; and Group Three 
is composed of countries with high FDI and high domestic investment levels.  
These groups represent progressive stages of development.  Thus, a Group One 
country must increase FDI before it graduates to Group Two, and a Group Two 
country must increase domestic investment before it graduates to Group Three. 
This Comment attempts to refocus the discourse about FDI and BITs onto 
developing countries by offering examples of BIT provisions that are 
appropriate for each grouping.  Each set of provisions reflects typical realities 
of countries in that group and aims to facilitate graduation to the next group.  
While each set of provisions directly addresses foreign investor interests—
because these are central to attracting FDI, and attracting FDI is important for 
all African countries23—they attempt to strike a balance between home-country 
interests and the immediate needs and long-term welfare of host countries. 
There is also an aspirational element to this Comment’s taxonomy.  Each 
grouping has its own set of priorities and goals that will guide countries toward 
graduation to the next grouping and eventually toward sustainable economic 
development.  Group One countries must reduce risk to FDI at all costs; Group 
Two countries need to strengthen the rule of law and encourage equal 
 
 20 This taxonomy borrows from Mushtaq Khan’s analysis of anti-corruption strategies presented in his 
discussion paper for the U.N., whereby low-growth “diverging” LDCs must become high-growth 
“converging” LDCs before becoming “advanced countries.”  Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms, supra 
note 13, at 5, 10–11.  Whereas Khan’s groupings are based on GDP growth rates, this Comment’s taxonomy is 
based on investment levels. 
 21 Natural resource-exporting nations could represent a fourth group, but they are beyond the scope of 
this Comment because the realities they face place them outside of the “virtuous cycle” discussed below.  See 
Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 294 (finding that “higher extractive production” 
reduces a host country’s “propensity to negotiate a BIT”). 
 22 In this Comment, “domestic investment” means investment by private domestic investors and is 
determined by domestic savings and gross fixed capital formation (“GFCF”).  The higher a country’s domestic 
savings levels, and the lower the percentage of its GFCF (essentially a proxy for business activity) that FDI 
represents, the higher its “domestic investment” level.  Lower “domestic investment” levels mean a country is 
more reliant on external finance, and higher levels mean a country has more sophisticated local entrepreneurs 
and industries. 
 23 See infra text accompanying notes 56–59. 
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competition among domestic and foreign investors; and Group Three countries 
should seek to attract higher-quality FDI and to maximize its positive spillover 
effects.  Like the BIT provisions discussed in this Comment, each set of goals 
is based on the realities characteristic of African nations at the relevant stage of 
development and represents a balancing of foreign-investor and home-country 
interests. 
This Comment envisions a “virtuous cycle.”  Each grouping’s BIT 
provisions aim to facilitate the pursuit of the group’s corresponding goals, 
facilitating graduation to the next grouping and a new set of BIT provisions 
and goals.24  The measures taken at each stage will attract the kinds of 
investments that are appropriate for that particular country at that stage of 
development—be it general FDI for Group One countries, domestic investment 
for Group Two countries, or a higher quality FDI for Group Three countries.  
The steps that a Group One country takes to attract FDI and graduate to Group 
Two will make it better able to negotiate BIT provisions that are appropriate 
for a Group Two country and to pursue its new Group Two goals.  This, in 
turn, will prepare it for graduation to Group Three and the pursuit of more 
liberal reforms.  While this Comment focuses on African nations, its ideas and 
the suggested BIT provisions may be equally applicable to other developing 
countries. 
Part I gives an overview of BITs, explaining why developing countries sign 
them and why they have not lived up to their maximum potential in Africa.  
Part II introduces Group One countries and discusses what types of BITs are 
best for reducing risk to FDI and what provisions are counterproductive to that 
goal.  Part III addresses Group Two countries and examines the types of 
provisions that can encourage confidence in the rule of law and encourage 
domestic investment.  Part IV suggests that Group Three countries are better 
prepared to embrace more liberal economic reforms but discusses provisions 
that are needed to grant host countries freedom to intervene in their economies 
when necessary.  Finally, Part V recommends mechanisms for amending or 
renegotiating BITs and potential alternatives to international arbitration. 
 
 24 This idea is borrowed from Koji Miyamoto, Human Capital Formation and Foreign Direct Investment 
in Developing Countries 9–10 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD) Dev. Ctr., Working Paper No. 
211, 2003), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/25/5888700.pdf. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
BITs have spread rapidly since the first such treaty was signed in 1959,25 
and today they are the primary legal mechanism governing FDI.26  All efforts 
at a multilateral alternative to the bilateral network of BITs have proved 
unsuccessful.27  While many regional investment treaties have been 
successfully negotiated, many argue—and this Comment assumes—that BITs 
will form the basis for the international investment regime for the foreseeable 
future.28  An examination of FDI in Africa, therefore, necessarily involves a 
discussion of BITs. 
Section A introduces the relationship between BITs and FDI and discusses 
why developing countries sign BITs despite certain costs.  Section B explains 
why FDI and BITs are important to Africa but argues that BITs have failed to 
achieve their potential.  And section C attributes this failure to the fact that 
African BITs tend to ignore important domestic considerations. 
A. The Mechanism Behind BITs 
Most BITs are made between a developed and a developing county and 
represent a “bargain,” whereby a host country promises to protect home-
country FDI in exchange for the prospect of increased foreign capital in the 
future.29  Developing countries incur certain “sovereignty costs” in negotiating, 
ratifying, and complying with a BIT30: They are less free to regulate in areas 
affecting foreign investment or the flow of capital because of the potential for 
sovereign liability upon breach of a BIT’s provisions governing treatment of 
FDI.31  They are also usually forced to delegate judicial authority to 
international arbitral bodies, which have the authority to adjudicate cases 
involving foreign investors.32  Developing countries accept these costs because 
 
 25 See, e.g., Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 67. 
 26 Elkins et al., supra note 21, at 265. 
 27 Muradu A. Srur, The International Investment Regime: Towards Evolutionary Bilateral & Regional 
Investment Treaties?, 1 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 54, 64–72 (2004). 
 28 E.g., id. at 68; see also Ryan J. Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and Bargains: Strategic Aspects 
of Bilateral and Multilateral Regulation of Foreign Investment, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 310 (2007) 
(noting “the strong protections provided by the current BIT regime to foreign investors, and the resistance to 
full liberalization of inward investment by some developed states” as reasons that multilateral efforts have 
failed). 
 29 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 77. 
 30 Elkins et al., supra note 21, at 278–79. 
 31 Id. at 278. 
 32 Id. at 280. 
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they expect them to be outweighed by the benefits of a corresponding increase 
in FDI.33 
Several different explanations have been given for the relationship between 
BITs and increased FDI.  Some scholars point to BITs’ stabilizing effects, 
which make a host country more attractive to foreign investors.34  A BIT’s text 
establishes a clear and independent set of investment laws that its signatories 
cannot ignore.35  And signing a BIT dissuades a host country from altering its 
own investment policies by elevating them to the level of international law.36  
Investors can enforce their rights through arbitration, which offers a neutral 
and reliable alternative to partial or inefficient local courts.37  Thus, BITs 
reduce the expected risks to FDI in two ways: first, they stabilize a host 
country’s existing investment environment;38 and second, they provide 
substitutes for weak domestic laws and institutions that are often ill-equipped 
to protect FDI.39 
Others point to a signaling effect, whereby a developing country that signs 
a BIT—especially a BIT with a highly developed country40—signals to 
potential investors that its commitment to protecting FDI is credible.41  The 
treaty raises the ex post costs of noncompliance by clarifying a host country’s 
obligations, involving the host government in future disputes and enhancing 
enforceability through arbitration.42  This may allow an unstable, or even 
corrupt, developing country to convince foreign investors that it will uphold 
and respect both domestic reforms that it has already undertaken and 
provisions of the BITs it has signed.43 
 
 33 Id. at 279. 
 34 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 523. 
 35 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 95. 
 36 Id. at 96. 
 37 E.g., id. at 75, 96. 
 38 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 523. 
 39 Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment 
to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005). 
 40 Kim Sokchea, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Foreign Direct Investment, 11 ASIA 
PAC. J. ECON. & BUS. 6, 18–20 (2007) (concluding that BITs with countries from the OECD signify a more 
credible commitment to a “stable legal investment framework”). 
 41 E.g., Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 117; Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: 
An Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, at lii (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs 
eds., 2009). 
 42 Elkins et al., supra note 21, at 278. 
 43 Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at lxi. 
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It is unclear, however, whether the benefits of signing a BIT—namely its 
positive impact on FDI inflows—outweigh the corresponding sovereignty 
costs.  Many studies have been conducted on the relationship between BITs 
and FDI, but their conclusions are often contradictory.44  Investment flows are 
difficult to analyze because of the number of variables involved and the lack of 
detailed data on FDI, and wide variations in BIT provisions, combined with the 
presence of complex regional factors, make BITs hard to quantify.45  For the 
purposes of this Comment, this debate is essentially irrelevant; developing 
countries, at least, seem convinced that BITs are worth signing,46 and there 
appears to be no viable alternative mechanism for governing FDI, at least for 
the foreseeable future.47 
B. The African Context 
There may be important lessons to learn from development strategies that 
proved successful in other parts of the world, but these same policies cannot be 
expected to yield the same results in Africa without consideration of its 
particular circumstances.48  This has proved true in the context of FDI—while 
gross FDI inflows to Africa have increased over time, Africa’s share of FDI 
has decreased compared to other developing countries.49 
 
 44 Compare RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 8 (2008) (arguing that the availability of real-time information on international economic and legal 
matters suggests that potential investors would be dissuaded from investing in countries that have failed to sign 
a BIT), Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit . . . and They 
Could Bite 22–23 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3121, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636541 (finding little evidence that BITs have stimulated 
FDI inflows and suggesting that the costs of signing a BIT outweigh the benefits), and Jennifer Tobin & Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The 
Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties 23, 30–31 (Yale Law Sch., Ctr. for Law Econ. & Pub. Policy, 
Research Paper No. 293, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121 (finding a very weak relationship 
between BITs and FDI flows that is only present in countries with stable business environments), with 
Neumayer & Spess, supra note 39, at 27 (finding that developing countries, especially countries with weak 
institutions, have increased FDI inflows by signing multiple BITs), and Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 
105–06 (finding that signing a BIT, especially with the United States, positively affects FDI). 
 45 Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at lvi–lvii. 
 46 Elkins et al., supra note 21, at 299 (recognizing that host countries sign BITs to participate in the 
global capitalist system and to compete with each other for FDI); Mosoti, supra note 4, at 103; Sachs & 
Sauvant, supra note 41, at lx; Sokchea, supra note 40, at 9 (arguing that developing countries promote BITs to 
enhance their investment climates and attract FDI by assuring their governments will protect it). 
 47 See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text. 
 48 Elizabeth Asiedu, On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: Is 
Africa Different?, 30 WORLD DEV. 107, 108, 114–16 (2003). 
 49 See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
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When making policy that affects investment in the continent, certain factors 
particular to Africa should be considered along with each African country’s 
particular circumstances.  First, Africa’s failure to attract FDI may be due to a 
“regional effect,” whereby African nations receive less FDI simply by virtue of 
their geographical location.50  FDI inflows to Africa are less responsive to 
increased rates of return on investment, improved infrastructure, and increased 
openness than to similar changes in other developing regions.51  Investors 
either lack knowledge about individual African nations, basing investment 
decisions on their perceptions of neighboring countries’ investment 
environments, or are aware of investment reforms but see Africa as inherently 
risky.52  It takes time for a country to modify its image in the international 
community, especially when it has a history of policy interventions.53  
Foreigners considering investing in Africa may fear that, given its historically 
ad hoc treatment of reforms, domestic reforms are likely to be reversed.54 
Second, African nations are particularly reliant on FDI.  Africa has been 
less successful at reducing extreme poverty than any other region of the 
world.55  Income levels and domestic savings are generally low in Africa, so 
foreign investment and foreign aid are often the only sources of financing.56  
Aid to Africa has increased, but not quickly enough.57  And thin financial 
markets mean that foreign indirect investment—such as portfolio investment—
is limited.58  Thus, foreign direct investment has become especially important 
to Africa, which must look to FDI to fuel its economic development and 
reverse recent increases in poverty levels.59 
 
 50 Asiedu, supra note 48, at 114. 
 51 This suggests that Africa’s decreased attractiveness to FDI is not simply because reforms there have 
been less dramatic than those of other developing countries.  Id. at 113–14. 
 52 Id. at 114. 
 53 See Jacques Morisset, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Policies Also Matter (World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2481, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
632551. 
 54 Asiedu, supra note 48, at 115. 
 55 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 56 See De Wet & Van Eyden, supra note 3, at 30, 32. 
 57 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2008: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 56 
(2008) (“Excluding debt relief, [Sub-Saharan Africa] received 37.5 percent of total ODA in 2006, up from 34 
percent in 2006 but slightly below its 38 percent share in 2004.”); UN Millennium Development Goals, supra 
note 1, at 12 (noting that aid to Africa would need to increase at a much greater rate to achieve its development 
goals). 
 58 Elizabeth Asiedu, Policy Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Absolute Progress but 
Relative Decline, 22 DEV. POL’Y REV. 41, 42 (2004). 
 59 UNCTAD et al., World Economic Situation and Prospects 2009, 26–27 (2009) (noting that “extreme 
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa may have risen by almost 8 percentage points, implying that the recent food 
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C. Rethinking African BITs 
In theory, BITs have the potential to be particularly effective in Africa for 
several reasons.  First, unlike long-term policy reform, a BIT’s signaling and 
stabilizing effects should take effect immediately.60  Many African countries  
are in urgent need of economic growth to combat extreme poverty but have no 
alternative other than relying on external financing to fuel this development.  
And while certain African countries  have encouraged FDI by improving their 
general business climates, this usually requires a long-term commitment to 
reform.61 
Further, BITs have the potential to address certain distinctive hurdles 
facing African nations—especially the “regional effect.”  A BIT’s signaling 
and stabilizing effects enhance the credibility of a country’s reforms and 
indicate a meaningful commitment to protecting FDI.  This should encourage 
foreigners making investment decisions to focus more on economic 
determinants and less on Africa’s reputation as a risky forum for investment.62  
In addition, because bilateral commitments aim at establishing long-term, 
mutually beneficial relationships, BITs promote communication between 
countries that should encourage potential home-country investors to make 
informed decisions that account for a host country’s unique investment 
opportunities and comparative advantages.63 
Unfortunately, BITs have failed to achieve their full potential as tools for 
economic development in Africa.  First, modern BITs vary little across 
individual African countries  and rarely deviate from a standard format that has 
developed over time.64  They all include five basic provisions: (1) scope of 
application, (2) conditions for entry of FDI, (3) standards for treatment, (4) 
protection against expropriation and compensation, and (5) investment dispute 
settlement.65  But Africa is a large and diverse continent, and liberalizing BIT 
 
price increases have more than offset the poverty reduction achieved between 1990 and 2004” and that “on a 
per capita basis, Africa will require the greatest investment push” to tackle the current crisis). 
 60 A country should be legally bound by a BIT’s terms upon signing it, causing a stabilizing effect, and 
any foreigner thinking about investing in a host country should be aware of something as public as an 
international treaty. 
 61 See Morisset, supra note 53, at 10–11 (observing that Mali and Mozambique were able to attract FDI 
only after prolonged reform efforts). 
 62 Cf. Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at lii (noting that BITs should “allow the key economic 
determinants—if present—to prevail”). 
 63 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 44, at 22–24. 
 64 Mosoti, supra note 4, at 115–16. 
 65 E.g., id. at 116; Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 79–90. 
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provisions that attract FDI in one African country may be inappropriate or 
unworkable in another.66 
Second, because BITs and the whole discourse surrounding them have 
become so focused on foreign investment, they tend to ignore important 
domestic considerations to the detriment of home and host countries alike.  
While there exists a healthy debate over the value of BITs to developing 
countries, most studies—both by supporters, who argue BITs positively impact 
FDI, and detractors, who claim that they do not—center on foreign investment 
alone.  This Comment argues that BITs that ignore important domestic issues 
forgo real opportunities to promote a host country’s sustainable economic 
development.  Domestic investment is a good example.  Studies indicate a 
strong positive relationship between foreign and domestic investment in 
Africa.67  Increased domestic investment stimulates FDI, much like the signing 
of a BIT does, by signaling to foreign investors that a host country offers high 
rates of return.68  Further, domestic investment has been an important source of 
finance in many developing countries69 and is critical to long-term, sustainable 
growth.70  Though FDI in Africa has increased steadily over time, both private 
and public domestic investment levels have been decreasing.71  This is a 
serious problem, and an exploration of BITs as a tool for improving Africa’s 
investment climate needs to examine their effects on both foreign and domestic 
investment levels.72 
 
 66 Cf. Khan, supra note 13, at 1 (“The challenge for developing countries trying to devise institutional 
reform and anti-corruption strategies is to learn the right lessons from the international experience and create 
feasible governance reform agendas appropriate and feasible for their own circumstances.”). 
 67 This is often referred to as a “crowding in” (as opposed to “crowding out”) effect of FDI on domestic 
investment.  Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 24. 
 68 Id. at 4. 
 69 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES xiv (2003) 
(noting that in 2003, FDI flows to developing countries totaled about $160 billion, while domestic investment 
totaled about $1 trillion). 
 70 See, e.g., Sumei Tang et al., Foreign Direct Investment, Domestic Investment and Economic Growth in 
China: A Time Series Analysis, 31 WORLD ECON. 1292, 1304 (2008) (noting that China’s domestic investment 
contributes much more to growth than FDI and encouraging promotion of domestic investment over FDI); 
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz & Léonce Ndikumana, Corruption and Growth: Exploring the Investment Channel 
12–13 (Univ. of Mass. Amherst Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-08, 2008) (arguing that growth from 
investment in infrastructure is unsustainable without private investment for its maintenance); Ndikumana & 
Verick, supra note 8, at 3 (“While FDI can stimulate growth, these growth effects are sustainable only if FDI 
stimulates the utilization of domestic factors of production, especially by increasing employment and 
stimulating private investment.”). 
 71 Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 6. 
 72 See Prakash Loungani & Assaf Razin, How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing 
Countries?, FIN. & DEV., June 2001, at 6, 9 (noting some negative effects of FDI, and arguing that policies 
must seek to attract both foreign and domestic investment). 
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This Comment divides developing African nations into three groupings 
based on a country’s FDI and domestic investment levels.  Group One is 
composed of countries with low FDI and low domestic investment levels.  
Group Two countries have higher FDI levels, but their domestic investment 
levels remain low.  Group Three comprises countries that have successfully 
encouraged both FDI and domestic investment.  These groupings represent 
progressive stages of development.  A country must meet certain benchmarks 
to graduate to the next grouping: a Group One country must increase FDI 
before graduating to Group Two, and a Group Two country must increase 
domestic investment before Graduating to Group Three. 
This Comment also recommends group-specific BIT provisions that will 
help countries from each group achieve a corresponding set of goals.  BIT 
provisions that reduce risk to FDI will help Group One countries attract FDI.  
BITs that strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law and grant 
Group Two countries a degree of freedom to promote equal competition 
among foreign and local firms will encourage domestic investment.  Liberal 
BIT provisions will attract higher-quality FDI in Group Three countries. 
The measures that a country takes to graduate to the next stage of 
development place it in a better position to negotiate new BIT provisions and 
to pursue its new set of goals.  This functions as a “virtuous cycle” that will 
guide countries toward economic development.73  Although this mechanism 
was devised for, and probably best applies to, African nations, it may serve 
other countries in their development efforts. 
II. GROUP ONE COUNTRIES 
Group One is composed of low-income, low-growth least developed 
countries (LDCs) with poor infrastructure, weak institutions, and low levels of 
both FDI and domestic investment.74  Many Group One countries are emerging 
from recent conflicts and desperately need to improve their infrastructure and 
the prevailing quality of life.75  The lack of domestic investment to fuel this 
recovery, however, means that Group One countries must look to external 
 
 73 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 74 See Loungani & Razin, supra note 72, at 8 (noting that FDI represents a greater share of capital 
inflows in countries with weak domestic policies and institutions). 
 75 Malawi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are typical Group One countries.  Liberia and Sierra Leone were 
involved in recent conflicts.  In 2006, all three had negative domestic savings rates—and thus were relying on 
foreign financing for domestic investment—and all received under $50 million in FDI.  UNCTAD, The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2008, 9, 35, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2008 (2008). 
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sources—namely FDI—for financing.  Section A argues that a Group One 
country’s dire need to spur economic growth means that reducing the 
perceived risks to FDI should be its primary goal.  Section B suggests BIT 
provisions on standards of treatment of FDI that accomplish this goal by 
maximizing foreign investor rights and limiting a host government’s freedom 
to regulate.  Section C argues that a Group One BIT must allow foreign 
investors to promptly refer a dispute to arbitration.  Finally, Section D explains 
that BIT provisions that demand institutional reforms at the expense of more 
important goals may be counterproductive for a Group One country. 
A. Risk Reduction 
Group One countries are typically either facing some kind of emergency, 
such as famine or AIDS, or emerging from a period of crisis or conflict.  They 
offer foreign investors unparalleled opportunities to benefit from first-mover 
advantages and the potential to obtain very high rates of return on 
investment.76  However, their instability deters FDI.77  The primary goal of a 
Group One country must be to reduce the perception among foreigners that 
their investments will be lost.  By minimizing the extent to which this 
essentially unquantifiable risk impacts the decision whether to invest, a Group 
One country can increase the expected rates of return on FDI.78  FDI is 
especially important to a Group One country because neither its government 
nor its citizens have sufficient capital to fuel meaningful economic growth 
through domestic investment, and a Group One country’s lack of natural 
resources means it cannot simply open its extractive sector and expect to 
 
 76 See John Bray, The Role of Private Sector Development in Post-Conflict Economic Recovery, 9 
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEV. 1, 5 (2009) (“[T]here are also opportunities arising first from the reconstruction 
process itself and, more broadly, from the possibility that investors who are willing to take the risks of being 
among the “first movers” can establish themselves before their more nervous competitors.”); Harry G. 
Broadman, ‘First Mover’ Investment Advantages in Sub-Saharan Africa: Why Northern Multinationals Should 
React (Quickly) to Their Southern Counterparts, CESIFO FORUM, Winter 2009, at 52, 53 (“Even if the 
investment risks in Africa are high so too are the returns.  Indeed, unlike virtually any other region of the 
world, Sub-Saharan Africa is the one location where true investment ‘first-mover advantages’ can still be 
found . . . .”). 
 77 Ernest Harsch, Investors Start to Eye Africa, AFR. RENEWAL, Jan. 2005, at 20, available at 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol18no4/184invest.htm (quoting UN Under-Secretary-General 
and Special Adviser on Africa Ibrahim Gambari as saying that “[t]he rates of return on investment in Africa 
are possibly the highest in the world,” but noting the many factors that deter FDI to Africa). 
 78 Risk reduction is important for all LDCs, but especially for African Group One countries given the 
“regional effect.”  Asiedu, supra note 48, at 114. 
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attract FDI.79  A Group One country that opens its economy to FDI while also 
indicating that it is more committed than other LDCs to protecting FDI should 
be able to attract foreign investors. 
The goal of risk reduction, therefore, should guide a Group One country’s 
investment policy and determine the kinds of BITs it signs.  Group One 
countries should seek to enter into BITs with highly developed countries.80  
And these developed countries should recognize that pushing for drastic 
economic, political, and judicial changes sets unrealistic goals and diverts 
attention from more important reforms.81  While more comprehensive reforms 
may be necessary for sustainable development,82 Group One countries must 
focus on achievable goals that will attract FDI and spur economic growth in 
the short term. 
Attracting an initial tranche of FDI brings a Group One country into a 
“virtuous cycle” toward economic development.  Each infusion of foreign 
capital will increase a Group One country’s per capita income, GDP, and the 
size of its market, thus boosting the expected rates of return on investments.83  
And a Group One country’s success at attracting FDI—especially FDI that 
improves the quality of infrastructure—will invite even more FDI in the future 
by demonstrating that investment there can be viable and that the country is 
accommodating to foreign investors.84 
B. Standards of Protection of FDI 
BITs are often criticized for being unbalanced and asymmetrical, favoring 
foreign-investor over host-country interests.85  While most BITs do emphasize 
 
 79 See Elkins et al., supra note 21, at 281 (“[W]hile the number of countries in which bauxite mining is 
profitable is quite limited, almost any jurisdiction can host a Nike plant.”). 
 80 Cf. Sokchea, supra note 40, at 22 (noting that signing a BIT with a non-OECD country signals a 
credible commitment to providing a stable legal environment only if a BIT has also been signed with an 
OECD country). 
 81 Cf. Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms, supra note 13, at 21 (arguing that corruption reduction 
strategies should aim to transform failing states into developmental states rather than set unachievable targets 
that divert attention from more critical reforms). 
 82 Cf. Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, supra note 70, at 14 (arguing that to achieve sustainable growth, 
both the quantity and quality of investment must be addressed). 
 83 See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at li. 
 84 See Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 11, 27 (noting that investors are attracted to “established 
market[s]” that “already cater to foreign investors”). 
 85 Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 547; see also AARON COSBEY, INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR., INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS 3 (2005) (noting that most BITs distribute rights and obligations in an “unbalanced” manner, with the 
JOHNSON GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2010  9:09 AM 
2010] RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 933 
FDI protection, which can be detrimental to developing countries under certain 
circumstances, there is no question that a BIT with stronger standards for FDI 
protection “creates a less risky investment climate” than one with weaker 
standards.86  If Group One countries are to overcome their reputations for 
instability and succeed in attracting FDI, it is critical that their BITs prioritize 
investor interests.87  Therefore, Group One BITs should maximize FDI 
protection by granting foreign investors as many substantive rights88 as 
possible and limiting a host country’s discretion to implement policies that 
affect FDI. 
Group One countries should make efforts to negotiate BITs with the United 
States.  Signing a U.S. BIT appears to cause significant increases in FDI and 
may even achieve the important host-country goal of investment promotion—
the “attraction of investment projects that the host country determines are in its 
best interests” rather than the creation of an investment climate that 
accommodates investments that foreigners “judge to be in their interests.”89  
U.S. BITs are especially protective of FDI.90  The BIT between the United 
States and Rwanda, for example, grants foreign investors expansive 
substantive rights, such as the right to prompt compensation for direct or 
indirect “measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.”91  It also 
sets high standards for treatment of FDI, promising that investments will be 
granted “fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security,” “non-
discriminatory treatment,”92 “national treatment,”93 and “most favored nation” 
 
“benefits tilted squarely toward the investors and away from their host states”); Ibironke T. Odumosu, The 
Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 361 
(2007) (arguing that the focus of arbitration has been more on protecting FDI than on balancing the interests of 
host states and foreign investors). 
 86 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 106–07. 
 87 This is especially true as the global financial crisis makes investors increasingly risk-averse.  See Org. 
for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., OECD FDI Outflows and Inflows Reach Record Highs in 2007 but Look Set to 
Fall in 2009, INVESTMENT NEWS (OECD, Paris, Fr.), June 2008, at 1, 3 (predicting that the financial crisis will 
result in a 40% decline in FDI to LDCs). 
 88 Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 342 (2007) (explaining that BITs “articulate specific 
substantive standards for investment rights” that protect FDI from “inappropriate risks”). 
 89 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 78–79. 
 90 Id. at 106. 
 91 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, art. 6, 
Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110–23 (2008) [hereinafter U.S.–Rwanda BIT]. 
 92 Id. art. 5. 
 93 Id. art. 3 (requiring “treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors”). 
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(MFN) treatment.94  These provisions reduce risk by extending protection of 
FDI to cover discriminatory policies, legislation, or financial and regulatory 
measures that affect an investment’s value.95 
The widespread use of MFN clauses means that a Group One country 
signing a U.S. BIT should also become more attractive to FDI from other 
countries.96  Typical MFN provisions require that a host country “accord to 
investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in 
like circumstances, to investors of a non-Party.”97  Thus, foreign investors 
from countries that have signed less protective BITs with the host country will 
benefit from a U.S. BIT’s heightened standards through MFN clauses.98  To 
maximize FDI inflows, therefore, a Group One country that has signed a U.S. 
(or another especially protective) BIT should continue to conclude BITs with 
other OECD countries, being sure to include MFN clauses.99 
Group One BITs should also limit a host government’s policy-making 
room.  This will create a more stable investment environment by dissuading 
future governments from reversing investment policies or enacting new 
regulations that adversely affect FDI.100  For Group One countries, broad 
compensation requirements for indirect expropriation (regulatory takings) may 
be desirable precisely because the resulting chilling effect reduces the 
perceived risks to FDI.  Where BITs allow signatories to specify “non-
conforming” measures, sectors, subsectors, and activities to which MFN and 
national treatments do not apply,101 Group One countries should be selective 
 
 94 Id. art. 4 (requiring “treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors 
of any non-Party”). 
 95 Franck, supra note 88, at 344–45. 
 96 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 107. 
 97 Canadian Foreign Investment Protection Agreement Model, art. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Canada Model 
BIT], available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf.  This model “serves as a template for Canada in discussions with investment partners on 
bilateral investment rules.”  Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) 
Negotiating Programme, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-
apie/what_fipa.aspx?lang=en&menu_id=45&menu=R#structure (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
 98 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 107. 
 99 The OECD is a group of highly developed countries dedicated to democracy and the market economy.  
OECD country BITs are the most desirable because they have been found to have a more positive effect on 
FDI than non-OECD BITs.  Sokchea, supra note 40, at 16. 
 100 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
 101 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 14 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT], available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.  The United States negotiates its BITs based on this 
model.  Bilateral Investment Treaties and Related Agreements, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/bit/ (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2010).  There are also provisions allowing regulations aimed at protecting public welfare that 
typically do not constitute indirect expropriations.  See infra text accompanying notes 191–96. 
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and careful not to leave themselves too much room to maneuver.  Group One 
BITs should also prohibit performance requirements and other obligations that 
impose extra costs on FDI.  Reducing a host country’s ability to disrupt the 
operations of foreign firms will encourage multinational corporations (MNCs) 
to make investment decisions based on purely economic projections and 
considerations. 
C. International Arbitration 
Group One BIT provisions aimed at reducing risk to FDI are useless as 
long as investors are forced to rely on domestic courts to enforce their rights.  
Foreigners view local courts as inefficient and fear discriminatory treatment.102  
Thus, while it may seem contrary to traditional conceptions of sovereign 
immunity to allow private investors to “unilaterally” bring a sovereign to 
trial,103 a Group One BIT must grant investors the right to enforce its 
provisions through international arbitration. 
It is critical that the act itself of signing a BIT constitute a Group One 
country’s consent to referral of investment disputes to arbitration.104  A Group 
One BIT should also minimize preconditions to this referral.  The U.S.–
Rwanda BIT, for example, provides that “the claimant and the respondent 
should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and 
negotiation” and requires that “six months have elapsed since the events giving 
rise to the claim” before its referral to arbitration.105  Most BITs require both 
consultation and a six-month waiting period.106  While these preconditions 
seem reasonable, a Group One country might consider decreasing the waiting 
period to demonstrate its commitment to protecting FDI. 
Even BITs that allow for prompt referral of disputes to arbitration may not 
go far enough to convince foreigners to invest in a Group One country.  
Despite the rapid increase in BIT signings, there have been relatively few 
 
 102 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 75, 96. 
 103 Odumosu, supra note 85, at 361–62. 
 104 Compare U.S.–Rwanda BIT, supra note 91, art. 25 (“Each Party consents to the submission of a claim 
to arbitration under this Section in accordance with this Treaty.”), with Agreement for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Egypt-Bots., art. 9, July 3, 2003 [hereinafter Egypt–Bots. BIT], 
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt_botswana.pdf (declaring that after six 
months, disputes are submitted “to a competent court of the Contracting Party . . . or by mutual consent 
between the parties to international arbitration”). 
 105 U.S.–Rwanda BIT, supra note 91, arts. 23–24. 
 106 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking, ¶ 105, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 (2007) [hereinafter Bilateral Investment Treaties]. 
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arbitrations—especially in Africa.107  There are several possible explanations 
for this.  First, most BITs only provide recourse for acts committed by the state 
and offer little protection against private interferences.108  Second, arbitration 
decisions are difficult to predict because they apply a body of law that is 
constantly developing, and they are typically unavailable to the public.109  
Third, arbitration is a costly and risky process—damages have been awarded 
less than half the time,110 and awards can be difficult to enforce.111 
A Group One country should consider negotiating BIT provisions that are 
drafted to address these weaknesses.  First, the “protection and security” 
standard, which typically requires that a host government provide only 
physical security, should be qualified by the word “full.”112  Arbitration bodies 
have interpreted this language to extend to legal protection as well as physical 
security.113  Thus, for example, an investor might be able to bring a claim 
against a host government for failure to foster a legal environment that protects 
FDI from private infringement.  A limited number of BITs address private 
infringement directly by allowing investors to bring claims against private 
parties.114  The BIT between Australia and Egypt, for example, provides: 
“Each Party shall . . . permit its investors to select means of their choice to 
settle disputes relating to investments with the investors of the other Party, 
including arbitration conducted in a third country.”115 
Second, BIT provisions that take into account developments in BIT 
interpretation may increase predictability.  Unlike most BITs, which are 
drafted in very general terms, the United States and Canada have used their 
experiences with arbitration to develop detailed provisions on issues such as 
 
 107 See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1, 33 (2007) (noting that there have been only two arbitrations involving African LDCs). 
 108 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 621, 632 (1998) (“BITs, for example, do little to protect intellectual property rights against private 
infringement or to provide for effective resolution of disputes between the investor and other private parties.”). 
 109 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 44, at 153 (explaining that it is difficult to develop consistent case 
law because BITs are usually interpreted by ad hoc tribunals); Franck, supra note 107, at 49. 
 110 Franck, supra note 107, at 58. 
 111 For example, claimants that have attempted to seize assets have had difficulty showing that those 
assets were commercial rather than governmental, and, thus, sovereign immunity did not apply to the 
execution of the assets.  David R. Sedlak, Comment, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment 
Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 147, 167–68 (2004). 
 112 E.g., U.S.–Rwanda BIT, supra note 91, art. 5. 
 113 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 44, at 153. 
 114 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 99. 
 115 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Austl.–Egypt, art. 14, May 3, 
2001, 2002 Austl. T.S. No. 19 [hereinafter Austl.–Egypt BIT] (emphasis added).  
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expropriation and standards of treatment.116  The Canadian Model BIT defines 
“investment” very precisely using a descriptive and exhaustive list of what is 
covered.117  Third, BITs providing for arbitration in Africa would reduce costs 
and encourage home-country participation.  This should increase arbitration’s 
local legitimacy, thereby facilitating the enforcement of rewards.118 
D. Institutional Reform 
In general, Group One countries’ BITs should focus on promoting stability 
and encouraging FDI inflows in the short term.119  Institutional reform and the 
rule of law become important only after a country has graduated from Group 
One.  It is true that granting foreign investors access to arbitration may reduce 
their vested interests in improving local institutions—and this may, in turn, 
inhibit the growth of a strong judiciary by reducing courts’ incentives to 
improve.120  But in order to attract foreign investors, Group One countries must 
do everything in their power to minimize extra costs to FDI—such as the 
expending of time and energy for judicial reform.  Otherwise, they present no 
advantage over Group Two and Group Three countries that are more stable and 
have stronger institutions. 
Group One countries should avoid BIT provisions that require active 
institutional reform and must be aware that such provisions are not always 
obvious.  Certain transparency requirements, for example, do not explicitly 
address the rule of law, yet compliance will require most Group One countries 
to devise and implement mechanisms to improve due process.121  This risks 
diverting a Group One country’s limited government resources away from 
measures that aim to reduce risks to FDI and encourage growth in the short-
term.122 
BITs that encourage the separation of powers and an autonomous judiciary 
pose additional risks to Group One countries.  A country’s political stability 
 
 116 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 142–43. 
 117 Canada Model BIT, supra note 97, art. 1. 
 118 See infra text accompanying notes 317–20 (explaining that, at present, Africans tend to be suspicious 
of arbitration because it is prohibitively expensive and takes place abroad). 
 119 Cf. Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms, supra note 13, at 19 (stressing that LDCs must direct 
their attention to the “more critical set of governance reforms”). 
 120 Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 119; see also Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 44, at 11. 
 121 See infra text accompanying notes 152–55. 
 122 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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weighs heavily in a foreigner’s decision to invest.123  Yet maintaining this 
stability can be difficult for Group One countries with meager tax revenues 
that leave little to redistribute to citizens, who may feel they are being 
cheated.124  In this context, it may be easier for government officials with wide 
discretion to distribute a country’s resources strategically—through patron–
client networks, for example—to appease powerful and influential 
constituencies and preserve social and political stability that would otherwise 
be elusive.125  Officials with a high degree of discretion have more freedom to 
manage critical interventions—such as providing infrastructure for productive 
sectors or teaching local firms to use new technologies—that benefit the 
country as a whole, but that place certain constituencies above others.126  To 
the extent that greater transparency or a more watchful judiciary limits 
officials’ discretion, these measures may prove counterproductive for a Group 
One country.127 
While corruption in Africa is often a byproduct of discretion in public 
spending,128 Group One officials that possess broad decision-making authority 
may be the only ones that can effectively maintain stability and intervene in the 
economy in ways that attract FDI and encourage growth.129  Of course, this 
Comment does not condone wholesale corruption.  It simply argues that it may 
be better for Group One countries to focus their limited resources elsewhere.  
In many Group One countries tackling deficient infrastructure, for example, 
may be more effective at attracting FDI than efforts to reduce corruption, 
crime, red tape, and financial market constraints combined.130  Further, certain 
types of “corruption”—in the sense that unofficial patron–client network 
 
 123 Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and 
the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 117 (2003). 
 124 See Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms, supra note 13, at 15 (“One of the fundamental 
problems faced by states in developing countries is to maintain political stability in a context of severely 
limited fiscal resources.”). 
 125 Id. at 15–16 (acknowledging that these patron–client transfers involve political corruption). 
 126 Id. at 14–15. 
 127 See id. at 19–20 (arguing that vulnerable states should focus on “strengthen[ing] the state’s capacity to 
behave in a cohesive and effective way” rather than transparency and anti-corruption). 
 128 Léonce Ndikumana, Corruption and Pro-Poor Growth Outcomes: Evidence and Lessons for African 
Countries 7 (Political Econ. Research Inst., Univ. of Mass. Amherst, Working Paper No. 120, 2006). 
 129 Cf. Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing that politicians known to 
be corrupt sometimes beat honest ones in elections because they are “the only ones who can deliver”). 
 130 Cf. 2009 GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT, supra note 2, at 74 (“In African countries the infrastructure 
constraint on doing business is found to be associated with 40 percent lower firm productivity.  For most 
countries the negative impact of deficient infrastructure is at least as large as that associated with crime, red 
tape, corruption, and financial market constraints.” (footnote omitted)); Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 
27 (“[I]nfrastructure is critical for attracting FDI . . . .”). 
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transactions are technically “corrupt”—can be important to a Group One 
country’s stability.  Regardless, a comprehensive long-term corruption 
reduction strategy requires transparency, an independent judiciary, and checks 
on executive power.131  For many Group One countries, these are unachievable 
goals.132  Group One countries that opt for BITs emphasizing risk reduction 
and maximizing foreign investor rights will use their limited resources most 
effectively and should be more successful at attracting FDI. 
III.  GROUP TWO COUNTRIES 
A Group Two country has increased FDI, but its domestic investment 
levels remain low.  Its successful graduation from Group One has gained it 
credibility among foreign investors, increased GDP per capita, and improved 
infrastructure—making it more attractive to both foreign and domestic 
investors.133  Yet domestic investment levels remain low for two reasons.  
First, Group Two countries have inherited weak and often corrupt judiciaries 
that inspire little confidence among local entrepreneurs that their investments 
will be protected.134  Second, a Group Two country’s preferential treatment of 
foreign investment prior to graduation from Group One has placed domestic 
investors at a competitive disadvantage. 
Group Two countries, therefore, must take action to stimulate domestic 
investment and local entrepreneurship.  A strong private sector will create jobs, 
increase productivity, and encourage the use of domestic factors of 
production—all of which are critical to sustainable economic growth.135  
Further, domestic investment has a particularly strong signaling effect that will 
lead to an increase in FDI.136  Fortunately, because a Group Two country is 
more attractive to FDI, it is in a better position to negotiate BITs that (1) 
 
 131 Ndikumana, supra note 128, at 32. 
 132 See Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms, supra note 13, at 17 (“[T]he fight against political 
corruption should be structured in such a way that it is not doomed to fail . . . .”). 
 133 2009 GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT, supra note 2, at 71 (“Infrastructure is an important part of the 
investment climate enabling the emergence and success of private entrepreneurs.”).  Ethiopia, Uganda, and 
Tanzania are Group Two countries that are making strides toward graduation to Group Three.  In 2006, they 
each received between $300 and $400 million in FDI but had relatively low domestic savings rates despite 
sustained growth performance.  Least Developed Countries Report 2008, supra note 75, at 9, 35.  Burundi 
represents a country that has very recently graduated to Group Two.  It had a negative domestic savings rate in 
2006—and thus was relying on foreign financing for domestic investment—and its FDI jumped from nothing 
in 2004 to $290 million in 2006.  Id. 
 134 See Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 121 (noting that courts may be “captured” by corrupt groups). 
 135 2009 GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT, supra note 2, at 71; Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 3. 
 136 Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 4. 
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strengthen the rule of law and (2) grant policy makers room to level the 
playing field so that foreign and domestic investors can compete as equals.  It 
is important to note, however, that Group Two countries must always be 
careful to avoid actions that risk deterring FDI.  Group Two BITs must balance 
investor rights and host country interests and should not grant policy makers so 
much room to maneuver that foreigners fear they will implement policies that 
threaten FDI. 
A. Strengthening the Rule of Law 
In order to increase domestic investment levels and graduate to Group 
Three, a Group Two country must encourage confidence in local courts.  
Domestic investors are motivated by the same goals as foreigners—
maximizing returns and minimizing risk.137  Inefficient or corrupt local courts 
deter domestic investment just as they deter FDI.138  Group Two countries that 
encourage confidence in local courts should therefore increase domestic 
investment in the same way that BIT arbitration provisions attract FDI in 
Group One countries—by reducing the perceived likelihood that domestic 
investments will be treated unfairly. 
Group Two countries must prioritize efforts to reduce corruption because it 
has a significant deterrent effect on domestic investment.139  BITs that 
expressly forbid acts of corruption discourage foreigners from bribing local 
officials and preclude claims to enforce contracts negotiated through 
corruption.140  Transparency provisions requiring proper accounting of FDI 
incentives discourage corruption by decreasing discretion in public 
spending.141  But corruption is self-perpetuating and resilient—simply 
exposing it is not enough.142  An effective corruption reduction strategy also 
requires a clear separation of powers.143 
 
 137 Ivar Kolstad & Espen Villanger, How Does Social Development Affect FDI and Domestic Investment?, 
2 CHR. MICHELSEN INST. REP. 1 (2004). 
 138 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 139 Kolstad & Villanger, supra note 137, at 24; see also Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, supra note 70, at 
14. 
 140 Victor R. Salgado, Comment, The Case Against Adopting BIT Law in the FTAA Framework, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 1025, 1065; e.g., International Institute for Sustainable Development Model Investment 
Agreement, pt. 3, art. 13, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf 
[hereinafter IISD Model BIT]. 
 141 Andrew Charlton, Incentive Bidding for Mobile Investment: Economic Consequences and Potential 
Responses 28 (OECD Dev. Ctr., Working Paper No. 203, 2003). 
 142 Ndikumana, supra note 128, at 3. 
 143 Id. at 26. 
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Group Two BITs must encourage autonomous judiciaries that are capable 
of checking powerful government officials who may be prone to corruption.  It 
is unsettling, therefore, that some studies show BIT adoption may actually lead 
to a decline in the rule of law.144  Fortunately, comprehensive transparency 
requirements, which demand far more than mere exchanges of information, are 
becoming more common among certain developed countries.145  This trend is 
promising for Group Two countries because these provisions should strengthen 
the rule of law and promote good investment policies.  This will encourage 
both foreign and domestic investments in four ways. 
First, comprehensive transparency provisions should encourage FDI by 
creating a more predictable business climate.  The U.S. Model BIT, for 
example, requires that signatories “promptly publish[]” or make “publicly 
available” all “laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings . . . and 
adjudicatory decisions respecting any matter covered by [the] Treaty.”146  
Signatories must “promptly provide information and respond to questions 
pertaining to any actual or proposed measure that . . . might materially affect 
the operation of [the] Treaty or otherwise substantially affect [a party’s] 
interests.”147  Contact points are established to “facilitate communications.”148  
By requiring full disclosure of matters affecting FDI and facilitating investor 
inquiries, these provisions will reassure investors that they are making 
informed investment decisions that accurately reflect all potential risks to FDI. 
Second, these provisions invite widespread participation in the lawmaking 
process that will encourage policies that are beneficial to all investors.  The 
U.S. Model BIT provides: “to the extent possible, each Party shall: (a) publish 
in advance any measure [discussed above] that it proposes to adopt; and (b) 
provide interested persons and the other Party a reasonable opportunity to 
comment.”149  Disclosure of proposed measures makes the process of domestic 
rulemaking more transparent.  And extending the right to comment to all 
interested persons encourages input not only from U.S. investors but also from 
 
 144 Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 121. 
 145 E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 101, arts. 11–12; see also Canada Model BIT, supra note 97, art. 19; 
Agreement for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Viet., art. 7, Nov. 14, 2003 
[hereinafter Japan–Viet. BIT], available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/japan_ 
vietnam.pdf. 
 146 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 101, art. 10. 
 147 Id. art. 11.3(a). 
 148 Id. art. 11.1(a). 
 149 Id. art. 11.2 (emphasis added). 
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other foreign investors and a host country’s own citizens.150  Foreigners will 
lobby for policies that benefit and attract additional FDI.  Locals, who now 
have a means to influence policy, will push for policies that encourage 
domestic investment and create a more level playing field. 
Third, comprehensive transparency provisions will strengthen both due 
process and democratic institutions.151  The U.S. Model BIT requires that all 
administrative proceedings affecting FDI accord with domestic law and that 
affected investors be given “reasonable notice” and an “opportunity to present 
facts and arguments.”152  Signatories are required to “establish or maintain 
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals or procedures” that are 
“impartial and independent of the office or authority entrusted with 
administrative enforcement” and which must provide for “prompt review” and 
appeal.153  To comply with these provisions, Group Two countries will be 
forced to develop reporting mechanisms and establish autonomous 
adjudicatory bodies, which in turn will bolster due process.154  These reforms 
will benefit foreign and domestic investors alike.155 
Fourth, transparency requirements have the potential to spur broader legal 
reforms that extend beyond due process.  Studies show that foreign investors 
have significant influence over a host country’s political decisions.156  
However, BITs that allow them to sidestep local courts may reduce their 
incentives to push for reforms that are not viewed as critical but would benefit 
all investors.157  Property rights reform and enforcement, for example, are vital 
to domestic investors.158  While they also stand to serve FDI, these factors are 
less important to foreigners due to the presence of BITs.159  Transparency 
provisions that facilitate investor input in the legislative process, however, 
reduce the anticipated costs of lobbying for reform, and this may be enough to 
convince foreigners to push for a stronger domestic judiciary.  After all, 
foreign investors stand to benefit from efficiency in local courts for three 
 
 150 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 78. 
 151 UNCTAD, Investor–State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking, ¶ 78, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007) [hereinafter Investor–State Dispute Settlement]. 
 152 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 101, art. 11.4(b). 
 153 Id. art. 11.5(a). 
 154 Investor–State Dispute Settlement, supra note 151, at 79. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 44, at 11. 
 157 See supra notes 18 & 120 and accompanying text. 
 158 Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 44, at 11. 
 159 Id. 
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reasons: (1) local courts may provide a faster, cheaper, or easier alternative to 
arbitration;160 (2) local courts are often important for enforcing arbitral 
awards;161 and (3) investors must rely on local courts for national-law claims 
and claims against private parties.162 
Group Two BITs can further encourage investor participation in policy 
formation and legal reform through their arbitration provisions.  Investors 
should be given the express right to choose domestic courts over arbitration.  
And a waiting period should be required between the time a dispute is filed and 
its referral to arbitration.163  It is important, however, that this waiting period 
be short enough to render the host country only nominally less attractive to 
FDI but long enough to ensure that foreign investors have a vested interest in 
good policies and legal reform.164 
To the extent that they promote a strong and autonomous judiciary, 
transparency and arbitration provisions can encourage a more level playing 
field between foreign and domestic investors.  When locals can rely on 
efficient and honest courts, arbitration no longer provides FDI with protections 
that are unavailable to domestic competitors.  But there are other competitive 
disadvantages facing local firms that Group Two countries must address. 
B. Leveling the Playing Field 
Group Two countries must also equalize foreign and local investor rights.  
Having graduated from Group One, a Group Two country no longer needs to 
maximize investor rights—FDI is less vital and foreign investors should be 
drawn to the country for other reasons.  Unbalanced BITs stifle domestic 
 
 160 Franck, supra note 88, at 368 n.150 (noting a practitioner’s comments that he would advise a client to 
pursue treaty claims in local courts if they were impartial to such claims).  But see DOLZER & SCHREUER, 
supra note 44, at 215–16 (“[A]rbitration is usually less costly and more efficient than litigation through regular 
courts.”). 
 161 Franck, supra note 88, at 369. 
 162 Id. at 370. 
 163 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 44, at 215–16. 
 164 Most BITs require a six-month waiting period.  See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.  Other 
countries require a longer waiting period.  See, e.g., Colombia Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 2, 2002 
(requiring a one-year waiting period); Norway Proposed Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 15 (requiring 
thirty-six months from a dispute’s submission to a local court).  The Norwegian model BIT was abandoned 
following criticism from businesses, which argued that the draft provided investors with insufficient 
protections.  Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INVESTMENT 
TREATY NEWS, June 2009, at 7.  Nongovernmental organizations also criticized the draft for not providing host 
countries enough freedom to regulate.  Id.  
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competition by making local firms less competitive.165  Broad expropriation 
provisions, for example, mean that foreign investors are more likely to receive 
compensation than their domestic competitors for the same legislation.166  And 
most BITs restrict performance requirements on FDI but allow host countries 
to grant performance incentives to FDI.167  This is problematic, and Group 
Two BITs must allow host countries to increase domestic investment and in 
order to graduate to Group Three. 
1. Standards of Treatment Regarding FDI & Compensation 
Group Two countries need pre-establishment rights that allow them to 
channel FDI in ways that promote domestic competition.  “Admission clause” 
BITs—which permit host countries to screen entry of FDI168—strike a balance 
between foreign investor interests and a Group Two country’s need to regulate 
FDI inflows.  The China–Botswana BIT is typical of this approach.  On the 
one hand, a party must admit investments “in accordance with its laws and 
regulations”;169 thus, all screening under the BIT must be pursuant to existing 
laws and regulations so a host country cannot arbitrarily refuse entry to FDI or 
adopt new laws that make screening easier.170  On the other hand, the China–
Botswana BIT covers only assets invested “in accordance with the laws and 
regulations” of Botswana, as the host country.171  This arrangement implies 
that admission standards do not even apply to FDI that is inconsistent with a 
country’s development policy as reflected in domestic legislation.172  Group 
Two countries that broadly and formally articulate development policies aimed 
 
 165 See Salgado, supra note 140, at 1047 (arguing that such provisions have an “anticompetitive effect” by 
“increas[ing] a foreign investor’s expected return vis-à-vis that of a potential domestic competitor’s . . . thus 
distorting the relative cost of entry of domestic competitors”). 
 166 Id. at 1046–47. 
 167 Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 122 (including tax breaks or expedited regulatory procedures). 
 168 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 21–22.  These are common in European BITs.  Id. at 
xiii. 
 169 E.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Bots., art. 2, June 
12, 2000 [hereinafter China–Bots. BIT], available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_ 
botswana.pdf. 
 170 Other BITs grant host countries more freedom to screen FDI by allowing a host country to change its 
policies after signing or by limiting the scope of investments covered by the treaty.  Compare Austl.–Egypt 
BIT, supra note 115, art. 3 (requiring that parties admit FDI in accordance with “laws and investment policies 
applicable from time to time” (emphasis added)), with Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, Ghana-Malay., art. 1, 2002, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ 
ghana_malaysia.pdf (“The term ‘investments’ . . . shall only refer to all investments that are made in 
accordance with the laws, regulations and national policies of Contracting Parties.” (emphasis added)). 
 171 China–Bots BIT, supra note 169, art. 1. 
 172 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 9. 
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at promoting domestic investment, therefore, may be able to deny entry to FDI 
that would thwart efforts to promote equal competition among foreign and 
local firms.173 
“Right of establishment” BITs, which prohibit the screening of FDI, have 
become common among certain developed countries.174  These are different 
from traditional BITs, which grant host countries a degree of freedom to turn 
investors away by extending substantive rights to FDI only after its entry.175  
“Right of establishment” BITs require that host countries apply national and 
MFN treatment “with respect to the establishment” of investment.176  These 
BITs usually define “investment” broadly so as to maximize their coverage.177  
“Right of establishment” BITs do permit some screening of FDI.178  For 
example, host countries can usually designate specific industries in which 
discriminatory treatment is allowed in a BIT’s annexes.179  However, this 
approach is dangerous for Group Two countries because they run the risk of 
signing a BIT and only later realizing that certain important sectors have been 
left out of the annexes.180 
Most BITs institute stricter standards of treatment once an investment is 
established.181  These standards do not expressly prohibit government actions, 
but they make legislating, regulating, and policy making more costly by 
exposing a host country to potential liability.182  Under most BITs, investors 
 
 173 Cf. id. at 22 (noting that “admission clause” BITs do not require a host government to eliminate 
discriminatory legislation that reserves certain economic activities for national investors or for investors of 
another nationality). 
 174 Id. at 22–23 (noting that while these are rare, they are the norm for the United States, Canada, and 
Japan). 
 175 E.g., China–Bots BIT, supra note 169, art. 3 (extending MFN and national treatment to “investments 
and activities associated with such investments”). 
 176 E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 101, arts. 3, 4. 
 177 E.g., id. art. 1 (defining “investment” as an asset controlled by an investor “that has the characteristics 
of an investment”). 
 178 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 23. 
 179 E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 101, art. 14.2 (“National Treatment” and MFN treatment “do not 
apply to any measure that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to sectors, subsectors, or activities, as set 
out in its Schedule to Annex II.”). 
 180 See infra notes 209–10 and accompanying text (explaining that developing countries often lack the 
capacity to anticipate future development). 
 181 E.g., supra text accompanying notes 90–95. 
 182 For example, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal held the 
government of Burundi’s revocation of a foreign investor’s free-zone status deprived the investor of expected 
benefits, and had an effect similar to expropriation, resulting in the reimbursement of some $3 million and 
creating a new free zone.  Antoine Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, 15 ICSID (W. Bank) 457 (1998). 
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can sue to recover for losses in an investment’s value caused by any measures 
that are found to violate a BIT’s standards of treatment.183 
Broad compensation and expropriation clauses threaten greater liability and 
have an even stronger chilling effect on efficient or potentially beneficial 
regulations.184  The U.S. Model BIT, for example, requires compensation for 
“measures equivalent to expropriation,”185 and the Federal Republic of 
Germany–Ethiopia BIT requires compensation for “[any] measure[,] the 
effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation.”186  The purpose of this 
language, which is very common in BITs, is to extend protection of FDI 
beyond traditional international law.187  Such language, however, opens the 
door for regulatory-takings claims to the detriment of both host and home 
countries.188  Group Two countries should negotiate BITs that minimize the 
likelihood that laws or regulations will constitute “indirect expropriation.”  The 
France–Uganda BIT arguably achieves this by prohibiting only expropriation, 
nationalization, and “measures having the effect of dispossession.”189 
2. Policy-making Room: Exceptions & Annexes 
BITs increasingly recognize that investment protection must not 
overshadow legitimate host-country concerns.190  General exception provisions 
increase a host country’s policy-making room and represent a balancing of 
investor and host-country interests.191  The U.S.–Rwanda BIT, for example, 
contains general treaty exceptions that recognize a host country’s right to 
protect the environment192 and national security,193 regulate labor standards,194 
 
 183 E.g., U.S.–Rwanda BIT, supra note 91, art. 24. 
 184 Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 554. 
 184 Cf. Been & Beauvais, supra note 123, at 134. 
 185 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 101, art. 6 
 186 Agreement for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Eth., art. 4, Jan. 
19, 2004 [hereinafter F.R.G.–Eth. BIT], available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ 
germany_ethiopia.pdf. 
 187 Been & Beauvais, supra note 123, at 141–42. 
 188 Id. at 126, 128. 
 189 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Fr.-Uganda, art. 5, Jan 3, 
2003, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/france_uganda.pdf. 
 190 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 142. 
 191 Id. at 80, 142. 
 192 U.S.–Rwanda BIT, supra note 91, art. 12.1 (“The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental laws.”). 
 193 Id. art. 18 (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed . . . to preclude a Party from applying measures 
that it considers necessary for . . . the protection of its own essential security interests.”). 
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and adopt prudent financial measures.195  Many BITs go even further: the 
Federal Republic of Germany–Ethiopia BIT, for example, allows favorable 
taxation of residents and favorable treatment of third-party countries for 
purposes of regional integration.196 
Unfortunately, most OECD BITs do not recognize the promotion of 
domestic competition as a legitimate host-country concern worthy of a general 
exception provision.197  Thus, those BITs that attract the most FDI are also the 
least conducive to a Group Two country’s goal of promoting domestic 
investment.198  And while attracting FDI is not as vital to a Group Two country 
as it is to a Group One country, it is nevertheless important to fueling 
economic growth.  Group Two countries would benefit greatly if OECD 
countries would acknowledge that economic interventions are important and 
legitimate elements of a host country’s development strategy.199 
BITs between developing countries tend to provide more flexibility to 
pursue development strategies than OECD BITs.200  The preamble of the 
Nigeria–Egypt BIT, for example, recognizes “the right of each Contracting 
Party to define the conditions under which foreign investment can be received 
and the investor’s duty to respect the host country’s sovereignty and laws.”201  
 
 194 Id. art. 13.1 (“The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by weakening or 
reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws.”). 
 195 Id. art. 20 (“[A] Party shall not be prevented from adopting or maintaining measures relating to 
financial services for prudential reasons . . . .”). 
 196 F.R.G.–Eth. BIT, supra note 186, art. 3 (providing that national and MFN treatment do not apply to 
privileges granted to investors of a third state on account of membership in “a customs or economic union, a 
common market or a free trade area or by virtue . . . of agreements regarding matters of taxation” and allowing 
for tax privileges, exemptions, and reductions for resident investors). 
 197 Finland is an exception.  See infra notes 200–06 and accompanying text. 
 198 See Sokchea, supra note 40, at 16 (noting that OECD BITs have a more positive effect on FDI than 
non-OECD BITs). 
 199 See S. CTR., COMMENTS ON NORWAY’S DRAFT MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (BIT): 
POTENTIALLY DIMINISHING THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY SPACE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTNERS 6, 10–11 
(2008), available at  http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=942& 
Itemid=248 (arguing that “promot[ing] the global competitiveness of domestic industries,” “infrastructure 
development, supply-side capacity enhancement, promotion of full employment,” and “the promotion  
of . . . development objectives” are “legitimate” policies); Salgado, supra note 140, at 1038–39 (arguing that 
developing countries have legitimate policy reasons to treat foreign and local investors differently, such as to 
encourage infant industries and SMEs). 
 200 UNCTAD, South–South Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements, 37, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3 (Nov. 2005) (published as part of the UNCTAD Series on International Investment 
Policies for Development); Bilaterals.org, South–South BITs, http://www.bilaterals.org/rubrique.php3?id_ 
rubrique=58 (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
 201 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-Nig., Preamble, June 
20, 2000, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Egypt_Nigeria.pdf. 
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It then makes the national treatment standard contingent on a host country’s 
development policy, leaving the host country free to grant “special incentives” 
to its local citizens and firms “in order to stimulate the creation of local 
industries.”202  The Egypt–Zambia BIT goes even further and omits any 
mention of national treatment of FDI.203  These approaches allow a Group Two 
country to enact laws that favor domestic over foreign investors even after a 
foreign investment is established.204  This is a great deal of freedom, however, 
and risks deterring FDI to a Group Two country’s detriment. 
Some BITs allow a host country to promote domestic competition under 
limited circumstances.  The Botswana–Egypt BIT allows “special policies or 
measures” that grant favorable treatment, incentives, preferences, and 
privileges to nationals, but “only for the purpose of promoting small and 
medium-sized enterprises and infant industries.”205  The Finland–Tanzania BIT 
limits such interventions to “limited incentives” that “protect small and 
medium sized businesses” and “stimulate the creation of local industries;” it 
also provides that Tanzania “shall eliminate progressively such incentives.”206  
Further, under both BITs, these benefits cannot “significantly affect the 
investments and activities” of home-country investors.207  This approach 
allows Group Two countries to promote local investment while limiting the 
risk of serious injury to large-scale foreign investors. 
BITs that do not recognize a right to promote domestic competition often 
allow host countries to exempt specific sectors or laws from standards-of-
treatment provisions.208  While this does provide Group Two countries with a 
 
 202 Id. art. 2 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, either Contracting 
Party may grant within the framework of its development policy to its own nationals and companies special 
incentives in order to stimulate the creation of local industries, provided that they do not significantly affect 
the investment and activities of nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party.”). 
 203 See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-Zambia, Apr. 28, 2000, 
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt_zambia.pdf. 
 204 Cf. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 34 (referring to the Agreement for the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Indon., art. 4, Feb. 8, 1999, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/indonesia_india.pdf (“Each Contracting Party shall, subject to 
its laws and regulations, accord to investment of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment no less 
favorable than that which is accorded to investments of its investors.” (emphasis added)). 
 205 Egypt–Bots. BIT, supra note 104, art. 4. 
 206 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fin.-Tanz., art. 3, Sept. 27, 2002, 
[hereinafter Fin.–Tanz. BIT], available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/finland_tanzania. 
pdf. 
 207 Egypt–Bots. BIT, supra note 104, art. 4; Fin.–Tanz. BIT, supra note 206, art. 3. 
 208 E.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 101, art. 14 (referencing annexes I, II, and III); Canada Model BIT, 
supra note 97, art. 9, annexes I, II, III. 
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degree of freedom to make policy, it is a risky approach because developing 
countries often lack both the capacity to anticipate future developments and the 
resources to negotiate these exemptions effectively.209  Group Two countries 
may find that after the treaty takes effect important sectors are missing from 
the BIT annexes.210  Several alternative approaches might solve this problem.  
First, if BITs allowed for the future designation of businesses or sectors as 
exempt from national treatment requirements, then Group Two countries 
would have the capacity to promote those industries that later prove to be 
important.211  However, in order for this right to be palatable to developed 
home-country signatories, host countries would probably need to limit its 
use.212  Second, a “positive list approach,” under which a country would 
affirmatively designate those sectors that are open to FDI, might be more 
appropriate for Group Two countries because it would allow them to conduct 
investigations and make informed decisions after signing a BIT.213  Finally, a 
broad general exception for industrial policy in a BIT’s annex would give a 
Group Two country room to act pursuant to a dynamic development 
strategy.214 
3. Performance Requirements 
Performance requirements—which impose obligations or commitments on 
foreign firms or projects—also provide a means for Group Two countries to 
promote a more level playing field among investors.  By ensuring that FDI will 
have positive spillover effects in the host country, these requirements can 
encourage sustainable economic growth.  They can be used to introduce new 
technologies, create jobs, transfer skills, increase productivity, improve 
 
 209 UNCTAD, Development Implications of International Investment Agreements, 8, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/2 (2007); see also Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 512 (“[T]he very fact that such 
countries are not developed means that there may not be any interest groups to demand the requisite 
exception.”). 
 210 Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 512 (“As a result, whole ideas and sectors may be foreclosed from domestic 
development, and the limited set of instruments at the disposal of poor countries for advancing their 
development is further circumscribed.”). 
 211 E.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Spain-Namibia, art. 4, 
Feb. 2003, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain_namibia.pdf (“Neither 
Contracting Party shall be precluded from designating, in accordance with its laws and regulations, a business 
or category of business as reserved for its own investors . . . .”). 
 212 E.g., id. (providing that “such designation (a) [be] made for the purpose of promoting small and 
medium-sized businesses only; and (b) shall not negatively affect the rights which at the time of the 
designation have already accrued to an investment or an investor of the other Contracting Party”). 
 213 Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 512. 
 214 S. CTR., supra note 199, at 11. 
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infrastructure, and encourage domestic industry—all of which are legitimate 
goals and common to development strategies.215  However, performance 
requirements impose extra costs on MNCs, and Group Two countries 
considering these requirements must carefully weigh their potential benefits 
against the risk that they will deter FDI.216 
Most BITs prohibit mandatory performance requirements.  The Canada–
Peru BIT is typical: it prohibits MNCs from being obligated “to export a given 
level or percentage of goods,” “to achieve a given level or percentage of 
domestic content,” “to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced 
or services provided in its territory,” or “to transfer technology” or other 
proprietary knowledge.217  While this provides potential investors with a high 
degree of certainty that their operations will not be disrupted, it makes it very 
difficult for a Group Two country to utilize FDI to achieve its other goals.  A 
blanket rejection of performance requirements therefore seems more 
appropriate for a Group One country. 
Fortunately for Group Two countries, there has been a trend among certain 
OECD BITs toward allowing performance requirements linked to FDI 
incentives—such as special taxation, government grants for jobs created, and 
other preferential fiscal and financial treatment.218  The U.S.–Rwanda BIT 
allows parties to condition “the receipt or continued receipt of an  
advantage . . . on compliance with a requirement to locate production, supply a 
service, train or employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or 
carry out research and development.”219  Here, foreign investors have an 
option: they may choose to receive certain benefits in return for operating in a 
way that promotes positive spillover effects in the host economy, or they may 
reject the idea altogether.  The U.S.–Rwanda BIT also allows an “importing 
party” to impose domestic content requirements and require foreign investors 
to grant preferential treatment to domestic producers if tied to “preferential 
tariffs or preferential quotas.”220  Typically, this provision would apply if the 
 
 215 See id. at 8–9. 
 216 UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements: New Evidence from Selected 
Countries, 34, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/7 (Jan. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Foreign Direct Investment 
and Performance Requirements]. 
 217 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru, art. 7, Nov. 14, 
2006, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_peru.pdf. 
 218 Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements, supra note 216, at 14. 
 219 U.S.–Rwanda BIT, supra note 91, art. 8. 
 220 Id.  The United States allows a host country to exempt certain sectors in the BIT annexes.  Id. art. 14, 
annexes I, II, III. 
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host country were importing goods for use by MNCs.  And the performance 
requirements that it permits—which target the promotion of domestic 
industries and local products—still allow an MNC to import foreign goods if it 
so desires.  This approach should make a Group Two country’s ability to 
impose performance requirements more palatable to MNCs, which are only 
required to comply if they stand to gain from them. 
It is important to note that OECD BITs that allow requirements linked to 
FDI incentives also prohibit the requirements from being used as conditions for 
“establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation or 
sale” of a covered investment.221  Performance requirements can only be linked 
to the “receipt or continued receipt” of incentives that are already established 
and that apply universally.222  This means that a Group Two country could not 
use special incentives to attract individual MNCs and projects or specific kinds 
of FDI that it believes would help achieve its development goals.  This 
approach is typical to an emerging group of “liberalizing” BITs, which defer 
heavily to market factors and seek to limit government interventions.223  While 
these BITs offer great promise to certain developing countries, they are most 
appropriate only after a country graduates to Group Three. 
A limited number of BITs—typically only the most development-
friendly—grant host countries great freedom to impose a variety of 
performance requirements.  The Finland–Tanzania BIT, for example, prohibits 
only mandatory measures “concerning purchase of materials, means of 
production, operation, transport, marketing of its products or similar orders 
having unreasonable or discriminatory effects.”224  Under this approach, a host 
country may impose whatever requirements it desires before an investment is 
established and may impose reasonable and non-discriminatory requirements 
at any time before or after establishment of FDI.225  This, however, probably 
grants too much freedom to policy makers. 
Group Two BITs must reflect the reality that these countries are still 
relatively new to FDI.  Having graduated from Group One, these countries 
must begin to address important domestic considerations.  But a Group Two 
country’s reputation among investors is still relatively weak, and MNCs are 
 
 221 U.S.–Rwanda BIT, supra note 91, art. 8. 
 222 Id. 
 223 See infra notes 243–54 and accompanying text (detailing this new trend in BITs). 
 224 Fin.–Tanz. BIT, supra note 206, art. 3 (emphasis added).  
 225 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 66. 
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unlikely to trust its short track record for investment policy.  A Group Two 
country cannot afford to deter the foreign capital that is still needed to fuel 
economic growth.  BIT provisions should only allow performance 
requirements in pursuit of legitimate goals—such as the promotion or 
protection of domestic industries—pursuant to an articulated development 
policy.  And these policies must not be allowed if they have unreasonably 
negative effects on the investment environment. 
IV.  GROUP THREE COUNTRIES 
Group Three is composed of African countries that have increased levels of 
both foreign and domestic investment.226  After graduating from Group Two, a 
Group Three country will have a larger and more robust economy, stronger 
institutions, better investment policies, an improved reputation among foreign 
investors, and more competitive domestic firms.  Local investors in a Group 
Three country are also better protected than those in a Group Two country 
because a more efficient and autonomous judiciary is capable of enforcing 
contract rights and combating corruption.  While the outlook may be better for 
a Group Three country compared to a Group Two or Group One country, this 
does not change the “underlying factors” that have made investment in Africa 
unproductive in the past.227  To guarantee that a Group Three country is on the 
path toward sustainable growth, policy makers must encourage positive 
spillovers from FDI and implement domestic reforms that will attract higher-
quality investment in the future. 
Once a country achieves Group Three status and addresses the most glaring 
disadvantages that its investors face vis-à-vis foreigners, it should be prepared 
to relinquish a degree of control to market forces through liberal reforms.  
Section A introduces liberal economic theory and discusses why developing 
countries should embrace it.  Section B examines a new trend of liberalizing 
BITs, which should be especially appropriate for African countries that 
graduate to Group Three.  Section C proposes BIT provisions that will grant 
Group Three countries room to encourage FDI spillover, which is addressed in 
 
 226 Although there may not be a perfect correlation, most Group Three countries are no longer LDCs as 
defined by the U.N. Committee for Development Policy. 
 227 See Shantayanan Devarajan, William R. Easterly & Howard Pack, Low Investment Is Not the 
Constraint on African Development, 51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 547, 568 (2003); see also 
Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 26–27 (discussing the relationship between FDI and domestic-factor 
markets and arguing that investment alone does not guarantee economic growth). 
JOHNSON GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2010  9:09 AM 
2010] RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 953 
section D.  And section E argues that it is important for Group Three countries 
to develop their own bodies of commercial law. 
A. Liberal Economic Theory 
Economic liberalism has come to dominate development theory.228  It holds 
that the Third World lacks the necessary capital, technology, and skills to 
achieve economic development without foreign investment.229  Market forces 
encourage specialization by those producers that have a comparative 
advantage; and this specialization—rather than the redistribution of existing 
wealth—fuels development through the creation of new wealth.230  Economic 
liberalism presents a theory under which all African countries can 
simultaneously benefit from signing BITs to attract an ever-increasing pool of 
FDI.231  Yet some scholars criticize BITs as “instruments of only partial 
liberalization.”232 
Liberalism holds that free markets should determine economic decisions.233  
Laws and regulations interfere with the market’s efficient allocation of 
resources and reduce overall productivity.234  Thus, BITs that allow for FDI 
screening, performance requirements, and investment incentives violate the 
principle of investment neutrality—a tenet of liberalism that prohibits 
discrimination among investments on the basis of nationality of ownership.235  
Commentators have argued that developing countries will not benefit from the 
economic growth associated with liberalization unless they “go well beyond” 
what typical BITs require.236  Viewed in this sense, BITs are not sources of 
liberal investment policies, but rather codifications of those policies that exist 
within a home country at signing.237  While a BIT does stabilize a country’s 
 
 228 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 502 (noting a “broad consensus that economic development is best 
achieved through liberalization of the economy”).  But see Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 463 (“The last quarter 
century has seen a re-examination and a rejection of the economic foundations on which that theory rests, and 
the creation of a new paradigm, based on imperfect information and incomplete markets.”). 
 229 Srur, supra note 27, at 60–63; see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 44, at 10. 
 230 Vandevelde, supra note 108, at 624. 
 231 See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at xlii n.36 (noting that steadily increasing FDI levels suggest that 
LDCs are not involved in a prisoner’s dilemma, which rests on the assumption that they are competing for a 
fixed pool of FDI). 
 232 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 517. 
 233 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 90; Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 504. 
 234 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 519.  Even policies carried out in the name of economic development 
are often flawed due to political pressure and corruption.  Vandevelde, supra note 108, at 635. 
 235 Vandevelde, supra note 108, at 629. 
 236 See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 515. 
 237 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 96. 
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investment environment, existing policies and institutions are more important 
to the decision to invest than the mere existence of a BIT.238 
Africa’s failure to attract FDI,239 therefore, may be due to the fact that BITs 
do not go far enough to promote economic liberalism.  FDI involves a long-
term commitment, especially the kind of FDI that promotes inter-firm linkages 
and other spillover effects that lead to meaningful and sustainable economic 
development.240  Yet Africa has a history of short-term and sporadic attempts 
at liberalization.241  Group Three BITs, therefore, must do more to convince 
foreigners that host countries are truly committed to economic liberalism and 
its “deference to a self-correcting market.”242 
B. Liberalizing BITs 
The emergence of BITs that go beyond mere investment protection and 
actually commit a host country to liberalization is promising for Group Three 
countries.243  These liberalizing BITs represent a sharp break from the past244 
and have the potential to benefit host countries in ways that traditional 
protection-oriented BITs cannot.245  BITs with liberalizing provisions have 
been found to increase FDI to developing countries significantly more than 
traditional BITs.246  This suggests that liberalizing BITs fulfill their end of the 
“bargain”247 by actually promoting FDI, rather than simply codifying existing 
investment policies.248 
 
 238 Id.; see also Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 44, at 31 (“[A] country must have some minimum 
level of political stability before BITs have a positive effect on their ability to attract FDI.”). 
 239 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 240 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 527; see also OECD, OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 7 (3d ed. 1996) (“Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest by a resident entity in one economy . . . .  The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship . . . . ”). 
 241 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 527. 
 242 Id. at 527. 
 243 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 144; see also Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at 
xxxvvi (noting that this approach is primarily limited to the U.S., Canada, and Japan). 
 244 See Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 144 (noting that while many BITs may appear 
different on paper, the real divide is between those that include liberalizing commitments and those that do 
not). 
 245 Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at lvi (“[I]t would not be surprising for ‘liberalizing’ BITs to lead to 
more FDI.”). 
 246 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 106–07. 
 247 See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 248 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 77, 106. 
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Liberalizing BITs contain provisions that “give greater scope for market 
factors to determine investment decisions and proportionately less scope for 
governmental decisions.”249  The U.S. Model BIT’s “right to establishment” 
approach, for example, opens sectors of a host country’s economy that were 
previously closed to FDI by prohibiting screening of FDI.250  The Canadian 
Model BIT prohibits host governments from imposing performance 
requirements on third-party-country foreign investors as well as Canadians.251  
This reflects an intent to move beyond simple FDI protection and to create a 
level playing field for all foreign investors.252 
Such deference to the market would undoubtedly be counterproductive for 
LDCs with weaker economies and institutions.  But after a Group Three 
country has graduated from Group One and Group Two, its economy is 
stronger, and it is in a position to minimize state interventions.  Signing BITs 
with liberalizing provisions, therefore, may be a workable means for Group 
Three countries to go beyond what traditional BITs have required in order to 
benefit from the growth associated with liberalism.253  Such BITs also offer 
Group Three countries a more immediate alternative to the kinds of long-term 
reforms that African countries have implemented in the past to successfully 
indicate meaningful commitments to liberalism.254 
C. Policy-making Room for Market Interventions 
Group Three is composed of countries with varying degrees of economic 
sophistication.  While Group Three countries as a whole are prepared for 
liberal reform, the degree of liberalization and deference to the market 
demanded by each Group Three BIT should vary according to the economic 
realities of each country.  Even the strongest proponents of economic 
liberalism maintain a degree of control over foreign investment.255  It would be 
unreasonable to expect African countries that are less politically and 
 
 249 Id. at 94. 
 250 Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at lvi. 
 251 Canada Model BIT, supra note 97, art. 7 (“Neither Party may impose or enforce any of the following 
requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or a non-Party in its 
territory.”). 
 252 Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 106, at 68. 
 253 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 254 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 255 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 44, at 79; Srur, supra note 27, at 72; c.f. Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 
481 (criticizing the “hypocrisy” of Western governments that are willing to protect their own economies but 
not those of LDCs by noting the U.S.’s protectionist actions against China and Dubai Ports). 
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economically prepared for the effects of rapid liberalization, therefore, to cede 
all such control.256 
While policy-making room is less important for countries after graduation 
to Group Three, full-on liberalization may be detrimental to their long-term 
development.257  Legitimate concerns remain that weak domestic industries 
will be “crowded out” by foreign investors and that rapid changes in the 
economy will have destabilizing social effects.258  Liberal theory itself 
acknowledges that interventions in the economy are necessary to correct 
market failures.259  Treaty drafters must recognize that Group Three economies 
are still vulnerable and susceptible to market imperfections,260 and Group 
Three BITs must grant governments room to oversee the economy and 
intervene when necessary.261 
Most modern BITs prohibit capital controls aimed at maintaining foreign 
exchange reserves.262  Yet Group Three countries have legitimate reasons to 
fear for their young economies.  Measures aimed at avoiding currency and 
price volatility when reserves are low are often central to their development 
strategies.263  The Japan–Vietnam BIT offers a potential compromise between 
a Group Three country’s financial concerns and the importance of liberal BIT 
provisions; it allows a host country to adopt measures that adversely affect FDI 
in “exceptional financial, economic or industrial circumstances,” provided that 
the home country receive prior notice and be allowed to question, comment, 
and consult on the measures.264 
Further, many BITs contain ambiguous terms that are difficult to apply and 
that may have a chilling effect on domestic regulation.  This hurts emerging 
democracies, which need to adapt to changing circumstances and preferences 
 
 256 Cf. Srur, supra note 27, at 73. 
 257 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 44, at 79 (noting that it is becoming clearer that factors not 
considered under economic liberalism need to be considered in formulating policy). 
 258 Id. at 80. 
 259 Vandevelde, supra note 10, at 505. 
 260 Salgado, supra note 140, at 1036–37; see also Odumosu, supra note 85, at 357–58 (arguing that the 
“neoliberal economic paradigm” is inappropriate for Third World states whose economies and populations are 
vulnerable to the negative effects of foreign investment). 
 261 See Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 463–64 (“[M]arkets by themselves are not, in general, efficient, and 
government intervention . . . can lead to welfare improvements.”). 
 262 COSBEY, supra note 85, at 13. 
 263 Id. at 14; Mosoti, supra note 4, at 128; see also Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 85–86 (noting 
that provisions on monetary transfers are often the most difficult to conclude because of LDCs’ “chronic 
balance-of-payments difficulties” and “need to conserve foreign exchange”). 
 264 Japan-Viet. BIT, supra note 145, art. 6. 
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and must be able to regulate in response to new societal problems or to restore 
social justice.265  Out of fear of being held liable for expropriation, host 
countries may be dissuaded from undertaking reforms that benefit foreign and 
domestic investors alike.266  Traditional standards-of-treatment clauses that 
require national or MFN treatment of investments in like situations provide 
good examples of this ambiguity.  It may be difficult for a host country to 
predict how an arbitral body would compare two investment projects, given 
that the projects are not fungible goods and may exist under very different 
circumstances.267  To decrease the chilling effect, a Group Three BIT should 
qualify that “in like situations” must account for domestic circumstances and 
general host-country needs.268 
D. FDI Spillover 
Foreign direct investment is not an end in itself for Group Three countries, 
like it is for Group One countries.  It is of little help unless it has a positive 
spillover effect in local economies.269  There is a “virtuous cycle” through 
which developing countries may attract FDI: (1) sound policies and an 
attractive investment climates encourage FDI; (2) human resource 
development by MNCs and inter-firm linkages encourage spillover effects and 
technology transfers; and (3) host countries take advantage of the upgraded 
skill level of their workers and spillovers to attract more FDI from higher 
value-added MNCs.270  This means that a Group Three country must focus on 
education and vocational training to raise its human capital to a level at which 
it can provide services for—and learn from—foreign firms.271  The cycle also 
suggests that it is necessary for Group Three BITs to provide for spillover. 
Many countries have successfully used performance requirements to 
maximize the positive effects of FDI on development goals.272  These 
 
 265 Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 515–16. 
 266 Salgado, supra note 140, at 1052. 
 267 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 93. 
 268 IISD Model BIT, supra note 140, art. 5 (noting that “in like circumstances” involves a case-by-case 
examination of effects on communities, “the sector the investor is in,” “the aim of a measure of concern,” and 
other factors (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 269 See Devarajan, supra note 227, at 568 (“Unless some or all of the underlying factors that made 
investment unproductive in the past are addressed, the results may be disappointing.”). 
 270 Miyamoto, supra note 24, at 9–10. 
 271 Cf. Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements, supra note 216, at 1 (“[W]eak 
domestic capabilities in a country hamper its ability to reap the benefits of inward FDI and limit knowledge 
spillovers.”). 
 272 Id. at 32. 
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requirements can promote inter-firm linkages that encourage the development 
of sophisticated local businesses by transferring technology and improving 
management, organizational, and marketing skills.273  BITs that prohibit 
performance requirements entirely may prevent host countries from promoting 
legitimate development strategies.274 
Even after graduating from Group Two, Group Three governments must be 
granted a degree of control over the entry of foreign investment.  Channeling 
FDI to underdeveloped segments of the economy, for example, has important 
“crowding in” effects that can improve human capital and technology, 
strengthen institutions, encourage domestic entrepreneurship, and promote 
faster and more sustainable development.275  And host governments must be 
allowed to prevent FDI from “crowding out” domestic firms in sectors that are 
already saturated.276  The “right of establishment” approach, which prohibits 
all screening of FDI, is not appropriate for Group Three countries.  A BIT that 
applies MFN treatment, rather than national treatment, to a host country’s 
admission of FDI would represent a compromise between promoting liberalism 
and respecting a Group Three country’s needs.  This would allow a Group 
Three country to screen FDI in order to encourage the development of local 
industries while assuring home countries that their investors would not be at a 
disadvantage.277 
E. Strengthening the Rule of Law and Promoting Legal Spillover 
Group Three countries have made great strides to encourage the rule of law 
and due process.  Yet it is difficult to imagine how a Group Three country—
during efforts to graduate from groups One and Two—would have developed 
the capacity to resolve complex commercial disputes as efficiently as 
international arbitral tribunals.  To the extent that a Group Three country’s 
domestic investors must rely on adjudication by less efficient local courts, this 
 
 273 Nicholas Apergis et al., Dynamic Linkages Between FDI Inflows and Domestic Investment: A Panel 
Cointegration Approach, 34 ATLANTIC ECON. J., 385, 393 (2006). 
 274 See Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements, supra note 216, at 41 (“Further 
discussions on the future treatment of performance requirements in IIAs need to recognize the right of 
developing countries to regulate and allow sufficient policy space to allow them to pursue their development 
policies.”). 
 275 See Apergis et al., supra note 273 (discussing “crowding in” and “crowding out” effects of FDI); Tang 
et al., supra note 70, at 1293 (encouraging host countries to channel FDI toward high-risk areas or into 
industries where domestic investment is limited). 
 276 See generally Apergis et al., supra note 273 (discussing the factors that determine whether FDI will 
have a “crowding in” or a “crowding out” effect on domestic investment). 
 277 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 19, at 93. 
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violates the liberal principle of investment neutrality.  Thus, a truly liberal 
Group Three BIT that is committed to promoting market efficiency should 
provide for both the establishment of a body of local commercial law and a 
judiciary capable of enforcing it. 
BITs can promote legal spillover by encouraging a more “symbiotic 
relationship” between BIT arbitration and local court litigation.278  Expansive 
transparency provisions that facilitate foreign investor involvement in the 
lawmaking process create pressure on host governments to enact laws and 
institute legal reforms aimed at creating and strengthening its commercial 
law.279  BITs that require investors to seek local relief provide local courts with 
opportunities to articulate and develop principles of domestic commercial 
law.280  A Group Three country with a particularly strong judiciary may even 
be in a position to negotiate a BIT that requires investors to resolve disputes in 
domestic courts, to exhaust all local remedies before referral to arbitration, or 
to limit the role of arbitration in reviewing these decisions.281  BITs that 
require more transparent international arbitrations—currently a very secretive 
process282—allow host country judiciaries to observe, learn from, and 
“internalize the benefits” of the adjudicatory process.283  Local courts capable 
of efficiently adjudicating complex investment claims will be able to compete 
with international arbitral bodies for the “business of resolving commercial 
disputes”284 by offering a less expensive and more predictable alternative to 
arbitration.285 
While a new breed of liberalizing BITs offer host countries the possibility 
to attract FDI more quickly, there have been recent signs of a backlash against 
FDI.286  This suggests that although liberalization may be appropriate for 
 
 278 Franck, supra note 88, at 367. 
 279 See supra text accompanying note 150. 
 280 See Franck, supra note 88, at 366 n.144 (noting that to require that investors litigate domestically, 
rather than take claims directly to international arbitration, might build the capacity of local courts). 
 281 E.g., China–Bots. BIT, supra note 169, art. 9 (stating that “the Contracting Party . . . may require the 
investor concerned to exhaust the domestic administrative review procedure specified by the laws and 
regulations of that Contracting Party before submission of the dispute” to arbitration). 
 282 Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 541. 
 283 Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 119. 
 284 Id. 
 285 See UNCTAD, supra note 210, at 8 (noting that arbitration can be costly, time consuming, and 
damaging to the investor–country relations). 
 286 Cf. Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at xlix. (“[W]hile the share of regulatory changes that are 
favorable to FDI remains high, the number of favorable changes has decreased significantly since  
2004 . . . perhaps signaling an increased skepticism in some countries of the benefits of FDI and a new 
tendency toward FDI protectionism.”). 
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African countries that have progressed to Group Three, this liberalization 
should proceed gradually.287  Home countries should not force overly-
liberalizing BIT provisions on developing host countries, and host countries 
should seek ways to attract FDI without reducing their policy-making space to 
promote development.288 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Mechanisms to Amend BITs 
This Comment suggests BIT provisions that are specially tailored to the 
particular realities facing different African countries.  These provisions will 
promote sustainable economic growth by pushing countries to enact reforms 
where necessary but granting them policy-making room when appropriate in 
the interest of development.  A new BIT can easily be drafted to include 
provisions based on the level of development of the home-country signatory.  
But it is important that there be some form of renegotiation mechanism to 
insure that the BIT continues to accurately reflect a country’s needs as it 
progresses from Group One to Group Three. 
The most obvious solution would be a BIT that provides for periodic 
revaluations of a host country’s circumstances and permits corresponding 
amendments of its terms.  Norway’s proposed model BIT, for example, 
establishes a joint committee with authority to “discuss issues related to 
corporate social responsibility, . . . the goal of sustainable development, 
anticorruption, employment and human rights, and . . . consider any other 
matter that may affect the operation of this Agreement.”289  Either party may 
call a meeting of the committee, which can “decide to amend the 
Agreement.”290 
Alternatively, a joint committee with powers similar to the one described in 
the Norway proposed model, but with less discretion, might be more palatable 
to host country investors.  This committee’s powers to amend would be limited 
to a BIT’s annexes.  Thus, host countries could introduce new sectors or laws 
 
 287 Cf. UNCTAD, International Investment Arrangements: Trends and Emerging Issues, 70, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2005/11 (2006). 
 288 Id. 
 289 See Norway Proposed Model BIT, supra note 164, art. 23. 
 290 Id. 
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that would be exempt from national and MFN treatment requirements, but the 
committee would not be permitted to alter the body of the BIT itself. 
To provide foreign investors with additional comfort, the bodies of these 
BITs should limit the scope of government interventions.  A host country 
should only be allowed to amend a BIT annex, or to make policy and 
implement performance requirements under a general exception, when the 
purpose is to encourage domestic competition.  Further, these interventions 
should only be permissible to the extent that they do not unreasonably affect 
FDI.  Finally, it may be important for some countries—especially those least 
developed—to maintain BITs that exempt existing investments from the 
effects of future regulations.  This last investor protection would allow a host 
country to negotiate amendments through the committee process, or to make 
policy under general exceptions, but these interventions would only apply to 
future FDI.  Existing investments would not be subject to performance 
requirements or new laws, such as those that encourage domestic competition. 
BITs could also include sunset provisions that are tied to levels of 
investment in the host country.  The provisions would be triggered when a 
Group One country attracts a certain quantity of FDI or when a Group Two 
country’s domestic investment achieves a certain percentage of total 
investment.  These provisions would require that signatories renegotiate the 
BIT and would suggest particular provisions based on the development 
benchmarks.  To the extent that these mechanisms effectively encourage 
tailored BITs, and thus more sustainable growth, they would be in the best 
interests of developed, as well as developing, countries. 
Developing countries have demonstrated interest in avoiding overly-
restrictive BIT provisions.  The number of BITs renegotiated due to changed 
circumstances has recently increased.291  More and more, countries are 
questioning whether traditional BITs—with broad investor protection 
provisions that reduce host countries’ freedom to regulate in the public 
interest—are appropriate.292  In 2007, twenty-three percent of all new BITs 
were the product of renegotiations, bringing the total number of renegotiated 
BITs to 121.293  While this represents a small portion of the total number of 
 
 291 See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 41, at xxxiii; UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International 
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then-existing BITs, renegotiations are expected to increase as countries revise 
their model BITs to reflect growing international recognition that BITs must 
consider legitimate host-country interests.294 
Developing countries have been reluctant, however, to grant host countries 
policy-making room to promote domestic competition, which is critical to 
sustainable economic development.295  The BIT provisions that this Comment 
offers represent a balancing of foreign-investor and home-country interests that 
will benefit developing countries for three reasons. 
First, granting developing countries policy-making room to intervene in 
their economies when necessary will allow them to continually improve their 
investment environments.  This will increase the number and quality of foreign 
investment opportunities available to firms in developed countries.  By 
investing abroad, these companies will strengthen a home country’s 
connections to the world economy, thereby stimulating its imports and exports.  
Foreign investments may also benefit home-country operations and 
shareholders by discovering new ways of conducting business that improve 
productivity, or by generating extraordinary profits through the application of 
“firm-specific know-how to new foreign markets.”296 
Second, developed countries benefit from promoting a serious commitment 
to liberalism by supporting Group One and Two countries in their efforts to 
graduate to Group Three.  Developed countries should therefore support the 
renegotiation of BITs that grant home-country investors unfair advantages over 
local firms.  While a BIT that focuses on investment protection may be 
beneficial to FDI in the short-term, some scholars warn that “the time will 
come . . . when developing states will not feel the same compulsion to attract 
foreign investment and may be tempted to renege on their promise of 
investment security.”297 
Third, emerging democracies need room to regulate.298  Allowing host 
countries to enact policies that favor domestic investors promotes more open 
governments and more autonomous judiciaries capable of combating 
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 295 See supra text accompanying note 197. 
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corruption and upholding the rule of law.299  While this does not directly 
improve a home-country’s finances, it serves important OECD foreign policies 
by encouraging democracy and reducing poverty.300 
Certain recent developments suggest that a new approach to BITs may be 
achievable.  First, in the wake of the global financial crisis, there appears to be 
a growing recognition—even among the most strident advocates of economic 
liberalism—that host countries should be granted a degree of control over the 
kinds of FDI that enter their borders.  For example, a recent International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) report reversed the IMF’s long-held position that 
developing countries should always avoid capital controls.301  Countries with 
concentrations of certain kinds of FDI—especially financial sector FDI that 
tends to make host-country economies more vulnerable to asset bubbles and 
other crises—fared worse during the financial crisis than countries with non-
financial FDI.  This is especially true for greenfield FDI (FDI aimed at new 
construction).302  The report noted that “there may be circumstances in which 
capital controls are a legitimate component of the policy response to surges in 
capital inflows,” but warned against a one-size-fits-all approach among 
developing countries.303  The report added that there needs to be “regular 
reassessment” in order to maintain the effectiveness of capital controls and 
ensure that they represent an appropriate host-country intervention.304 
Second, the United States is currently reviewing its Model BIT in order to 
“ensure that it is consistent with the public interest and the overall U.S. 
economic agenda.”305  The advisory committee charged with evaluating the 
document has submitted its report.  The report appears to represent both sides 
of the debate equally; it addresses concerns that the Model BIT needs to be 
more protective of U.S. investors as well as concerns about undermining host-
 
 299 See Ndikumana & Verick, supra note 8, at 12 ( “[P]rivate investment is higher in strongly democratic 
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Note No. SPN/10/04 (Feb. 19, 2010). 
 302 Id. at 13. 
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country interests.306  While the Obama Administration has yet to indicate what 
changes it will implement, President Obama’s campaign promise to “ensure 
that foreign investor rights are strictly limited and will fully exempt any law or 
regulation written to protect public safety or promote the public interest” 
suggests that U.S. policy toward FDI will be more sensitive to host-country 
interests.307 
Finally, evidence suggests that BIT renegotiations will become more 
common.308  If the IMF is willing to recognize the legitimacy of host-country 
interventions surrounding FDI, the United States under President Obama will 
likely follow suit.  And given the economic clout of the United States and its 
influence over the international community, such a shift in U.S. investment 
policy may encourage countries to renegotiate BITs so that the treaties balance 
home- and host-country interests more equitably. 
B. Alternatives to International Arbitration 
Virtually all modern BITs allow foreign investors to resolve disputes 
through international arbitration.  The predominant institution for the 
settlement of such disputes is the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which functions under the aegis of the World 
Bank.309  Developing countries that have avoided arbitration provisions share 
certain characteristics, none of which are present in Group One, Two, or Three 
countries.310  Thus, even if critics of arbitration are correct that it is 
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asymmetric,311 lacking in due process,312 or even that it risks losing its 
relevance and legitimacy,313 African countries are not likely to attract FDI if 
they do not grant foreign investors the right to resort to some form of 
independent adjudication.  There may, however, be alternatives to ICSID that 
serve the same purposes.314 
An international commercial court might be a viable alternative to 
“privatization of the judiciary” through international arbitration.315  Full-time 
expert judges would be less subject to conflicts of interest than arbitrators.  
Higher standards of due process could be required and could include greater 
transparency and more comprehensive appellate procedures.  Finally, greater 
deference could be paid to a host country’s laws and public interest.316 
A less dramatic alternative would be for international arbitral bodies to 
encourage the localization of arbitration.  Africa is rarely a venue for 
arbitrations, and there are relatively few African arbitrators.317  This has 
resulted in a general ignorance and suspicion of arbitration among Africans, 
which is exacerbated by the opaqueness of the arbitration process.318  Creating 
regional training centers and making efforts to hold arbitrations locally would 
serve several goals. 
First, it would encourage legal spillovers.  Host-country judiciaries would 
be better able to observe and learn from the adjudication process; these local 
courts, capable of efficiently adjudicating complex investment claims, could 
compete with arbitral bodies by offering cheaper and more predictable 
alternatives to arbitration.319  Second, regional arbitral bodies would increase 
international arbitration’s local legitimacy by making it more receptive to local 
concerns and decreasing costs to host governments, which would then be more 
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capable of obtaining fair representation.  Third, regional arbitral bodies would 
render arbitration more accessible to small- and medium-sized regional 
enterprises for which arbitration is currently too expensive—thus stimulating 
regional South–South investment.320 
CONCLUSION 
Bilateral Investment Treaties have great potential in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
For many countries, BITs represent the most efficient means to attract the 
foreign investment that is desperately needed to fuel economic development.  
But BITs have failed to achieve their potential in Africa. 
Most BITs are instruments of the theoretical ideal of economic liberalism.  
This may explain why the treaties vary little across countries at different stages 
of development—in theory, liberal reforms should spur development wherever 
applied.  While this Comment embraces economic liberalism and the power of 
the market, it argues that BITs have failed in Africa precisely because of their 
strict adherence to a theoretical model.  As a result, BITs do not account for 
important domestic considerations among developing countries.  Instead of 
encouraging reforms and attracting the kinds of FDI that move each 
developing country toward sustainable development based on its particular 
capacities and needs, BITs end up imposing policies that are insufficient for 
some countries and impracticable for others. 
At the same time, strict compensation provisions—for example, for 
regulatory takings—make it difficult for host governments to intervene and 
correct market inefficiencies.  Provisions that reflect economic liberalism’s 
belief that free markets—not governments—should determine economic 
decisions have a chilling effect on domestic policy making that stymies 
legitimate development strategies.  While there have been promising 
innovations in certain BIT provisions, these provisions are not appropriate for 
all African countries. 
This Comment’s three-group taxonomy aims to refocus the discourse about 
FDI and BITs on developing countries.  BIT provisions that reduce risk to FDI 
will help Group One countries attract FDI.  BITs that strengthen democratic 
institutions and the rule of law, giving Group Two countries a degree of 
freedom to promote equal competition among foreign and local firms, will 
encourage domestic investment.  And liberal BIT provisions will attract 
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higher-quality FDI in Group Three countries.  The measures that a country 
takes to graduate to the next stage of development place it in a better position 
to negotiate new BIT provisions and to pursue a new set of goals. 
Designing BIT provisions based on a host country’s FDI and domestic 
investment levels, and reevaluating BITs as a country advances toward and 
beyond Group Three status, will encourage sustainable development to the 
benefit of home and host countries alike.  And although this mechanism was 
devised for, and probably best applies to, African countries, it may serve other 
countries in their efforts toward development. 
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